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WHY DON'T MORE PUBLIC SCHOOLS TEACH SEX
EDUCATION?: A CONSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION AND
CRITIQUE
JESSE R. MERRIAM*
In the culture war between the religious right and the secular
left, much of the fighting centers around sex education. Appearing
ubiquitously in various media outlets and academic commentary,'
both sides advance familiar arguments. The religious right contends
that to protect teenagers from pregnancy and sexually transmitted
diseases (STDs), public high schools must encourage students to ab-
stain from sexual activity.' In contrast, the secular left claims that
because young people will have sex regardless of whether schools
teach them sexual abstinence, public high schools must teach teen-
agers how to engage in safe sex.3 What many Americans may not
* Jesse R. Merriam (jmerriam@gmail.com) is an associate at the Center for
Constitutional Litigation, P.C., where he litigates various constitutional issues in state
and federal courts. For their help in preparing this article, he would like to thank
Professor Catherine J. Ross (George Washington Law), Sara Burch (his fiancde), and the
exceptionally gifted members of the William and Mary Journal of Women and the Law.
1. For a general and enlightening discussion of the history of the sex education con-
flict between the religious right and secular left, see KRISTIN LUKER, WHEN SEX GOES
TO SCHOOL: WARRING VIEWS ON SEX-AND SEX EDUCATION- SINCE THE SIXTIES (2006).
For commentary on the culture war, see JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE
STRUGGLE TO DEFINEAMERICA (1991), a book that increased the use of the war analogy.
Also, see NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM - AND
WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABoUT IT (2005) for a treatment of the culture war's religious
elements.
2. The legislative enactment best expressing the religious right's approach to sex
education is the Adolescent Family Life Act ("AFLA"), Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 578,
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300z) (1981). Republican Senators Orrin Hatch and Jeremiah
Denton sponsored the Act, which was designed to deprive the comprehensive sex edu-
cation movement of federal funding. According to UC Berkeley sociologist Professor
Kristin Luker, "AFLA is where the idea of'abstinence education' made its debut on the
national scene .... LUKER, supra note 1, at 222. Abstinence sex education was formal-
ized as a Republican stance in 1988 when the Republic National Platform stated: "We
oppose any programs in public schools which provide birth control or abortion services
or referrals. Our first line of defense ... must be abstinence education ... "Id. at 18 n.5.
3. The Democrats expressed their stance on the sex education issue in 1978 when
Senator Edward Kennedy led the expansion of comprehensive sex education. LUKER, supra
note 1, at 221-22. Recently, in response to the growing Republican attack on comprehen-
sive sex education, the Democrats strengthened their attack on abstinence education.
In December of 2004, Representative Henry A. Waxman, a Democrat from California,
released a report providing examples of inaccurate information (for example, "that HIV
can be contracted through exposure to sweat and tears") included in federally funded
abstinence-only sex education programs. See ACLU, Responsible Spending: Real Sex Ed
for Real Lives, Feb. 18. 2005, available at http://www.aclu.org/reproductiverights/sexed/
12622res20050218.html. This report has bolstered the secular left's argument against
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know is that in some places the dispute about how to teach sex edu-
cation is not yet relevant because the public schools have not answered
the threshold question of whether to teach sex education. This article
addresses this threshold question.
Most state legislatures do not require any of their public schools
to teach sex education,4 opting instead to leave the decision entirely
to the local school boards. Exercising this discretion granted from
their state legislatures, some public schools choose not to teach sex
education. According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), 15.2%
of public high schools and 30.9% of public junior high schools do not
require any STD prevention education, including abstinence sex
education.5 Although some confusion exists as to precisely how many
teenagers do not receive any formal sex education, evidence sug-
gests that because a significant percentage of public schools are not
teaching any sex education, many teenagers receive no formal sex
education at all.6 Whatever the actual numbers, the problem is that
some teenagers become adults without formally learning anything
about STDs and pregnancy. These people are the forgotten soldiers
in the culture war over sex education.
That some people go through public education without receiving
any sex education is both troubling and surprising. It is troubling
because widespread sex education, either encouraging abstinence
or safe sex, has only beneficial effects.7 It is surprising because an
abstinence sex education.
4. A 2004 study found that only twenty-two states require their public schools to
teach sex education. See Debra Surgan, Sexuality, Gender, and Curricula, 5 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 343, 343-44 (2004).
5. CENTERS FOR DISEASE AND PREVENTION, FACT SHEET SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED
DISEASE PREVENTION FROM CDC's HEALTH POLICIES AND PROGRAMS STUDY 2000,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/HealthyYouthlshpps/factsheets/pdflstdprev.pdf
6. Some of the confusion is due to the fact that some studies consider the percentage
of schools requiring sex education, rather than the percentage of students actually re-
ceiving sex education. See, e.g., id. Another cause of the confusion is that the term sex
education seems to mean different things to different people. This article uses the term
sex education to describe a formal educational program covering human sexual anatomy,
reproduction, and intercourse. Covering these subjects adequately would likely take
several class periods. According to a 1999 Kaiser Family Foundation survey, however,
"three out of four of those actually charged with teaching sex said that in their schools,
the subject was covered in only a few class periods, sometimes as few as one." LUKER,
supra note 1, at 251. If people interpret one class period as constituting adequate sex
education, one should not be surprised that between ninety-five and ninety-seven percent
of teenagers report having some sex education. Id. Based on the data in the CDC and
Kaiser Family Foundation studies, a significant percentage of teenagers who report re-
ceiving sex education likely learn only the bare basics about sex in the classroom and
are not actually receiving sex education.
7. To determine the efficacy of sex education, the CDC assembled a panel of experts
to synthesize seventeen studies on the subject. The research synthesis found that sex
education has no negative effects (for example, sex education, whether comprehensive
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overwhelming majority of citizens support some form of sex education.'
This fact makes for a highly important and interesting question: Why
don't more public schools teach sex education?
The answer to this question is that the United States Constitution
is a factor in the unwillingness of public schools to teach sex edu-
cation.9 This claim is based on the following two premises: (1) the
Constitution almost certainly does not require public schools to teach
sex education, and (2) the Constitution arguably requires public
schools that teach sex education to exempt those students whose
religious beliefs are substantially burdened by sex education. To
illustrate how these two premises might affect a school district's
decision not to teach sex education, this article is framed as an analy-
sis of a question posed to a school district attorney as to how the dis-
trict should respond to threatened constitutional litigation regarding
sex education.
Part I describes the hypothetical problem, which is based on real
situations school districts face." According to this hypothetical, some
students and parents, the liberals in the culture war, favor sex edu-
cation but live in a district where the public schools do not teach sex
education and in a state that does not currently require its public
or abstinence-based, does not accelerate or increase sexual activity), and some sex edu-
cation programs have positive effects (for example, some programs delay sexual activity
and increase condom use). See National Education Association Health Information
Network, School-Based HIV, STD, and Pregnancy Prevention Education: What Works?,
available at http://neahin.org/programs/reproductive/works/index.htm (last visited Feb.
21, 2007).
8. According to Professor Luker, although opposition to sex education has always
existed, the opposition has never been popular. LUKER, supra note 1, at 220. Only the most
conservative groups, like the John Birch Society, have opposed all forms of sex education.
Id. In fact, Professor Luker writes, "opinion leaders of almost every stripe believed that
sex education was the best response to the twin problems of teenage pregnancy and
HIV/AIDS." Id.
9. Note that this article's thesis is that the Constitution is a factor, not that the
Constitution is the only factor. In other words, the goal of this article is not to resolve con-
clusively why so many public schools do not teach sex education, but rather to generate
more discussion on this issue. For this reason, although framing the problem in constitu-
tional and theoretical terms, this article acknowledges, and indeed embraces, the need
for a more empirical examination of the problem.
10. This hypothetical problem is based loosely on the conflict that recently arose in
Montgomery County, Maryland. For coverage of the conflict, see Lori Aratani & Daniel
de Vise, Montgomery Blindsided Over Sex-Ed: Program Backers Blame Conservative
Movement, WASH. POST, May 7, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost
.comwp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/06/AR2005050601648.html; Daniel de Vise, Sex-Ed
Plan Could Revive Heated Debate From 2005, WASH. POST, January 5, 2007, at B4,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/04/AR2007
010401808.html. This hypothetical problem also draws from case studies presented in
LUKER, supra note 1 (examining the sex education conflict by interviewing parents and
leaders in four representative communities).
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schools to do so. Therefore, to pressure the schools to teach the sub-
ject, these students and parents claim that they have a constitutional
right to have their public schools teach sex education. Opposing these
liberals are the conservatives who claim that they have a constitu-
tional right not to be taught sex education.
Part II analyzes the constitutional dimensions of the sex edu-
cation debate. 1 This analysis branches into the two premises upon
which this article's thesis is based. Part II.A analyzes the constitu-
tional arguments in favor of sex education, whereas Part II.B consid-
ers the constitutional arguments for exemptions from sex education.
Based on the relative strengths of these constitutional arguments,
Part III offers a solution to the problem: not to teach sex education.
After noting that this solution is not a solution at all, in that it will
not solve the social, health, and economic problems that result when
young citizens are uninformed or misinformed about sex, Part III
departs from Part II's descriptive format and briefly explores, as a
normative matter, whether society should break the constitutional
constraints that lead public schools to make this problematic de-
cision. Given that applying act-utilitarianism 2 to judicial decision
making rarely makes for good jurisprudence, 3 and, more importantly,
that various American political institutions have already acted to
solidify these constraints, Part III concludes that any practical so-
lution to the problem must work from within, rather than against,
the constraints. Accordingly, Part III offers a constitutional compro-
mise consisting of three proposals as to how the government may
educate children and teenagers about sex within these constraints.
11. Part II merely describes the constitutional arguments available in case law,
rather than arguing why courts should reach a particular outcome as a matter of policy.
Part II is framed this way so that normative judgments do not conceal the fact that the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution has played a role in discouraging
public schools from teaching sex education. In this respect, this article is a part of a grow-
ing body of scholarship on how the Constitution and the judiciary's role in interpreting
it can exacerbate and even cause major national crises. See, e.g., MARK E. BRANDON,
FREE INTHE WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERYAND CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE (1998); MARKA.
GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006); SANFORD
LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG
(AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
12. Act-utilitarianism is the term philosophers use to describe an application of
utilitarianism that permits a departure from utilitarian rules when such a departure
maximizes happiness. See ROGER CRISP, MILL ON UTILITARIANISM 113 (1997). Rule-
utilitarianism, by contrast, adopts rules that maximize happiness and does not permit
exceptions to such rules, even in the instances when allowing for an exception would
maximize happiness. See id.
13. For commentary on the problems that arise when judges tailor doctrines to discrete
fact patterns, see generally Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. Cmu. L.
REV. 883 (2006).
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The article ends with a consideration of how the preceding discussion
contributes to developing an understanding of the Constitution and
those charged with interpreting it.
I. A SCHOOL DISTRICT'S DILEMMA OF WHETHER TO TEACH SEX
EDUCATION
Imagine you are a school district attorney in a state that does
not require its public schools to teach sex education. Students and
parents in the district want the public high school to teach sex edu-
cation, and they are pressuring your school district to institute com-
pulsory sex education. Based on sex education polls and research,
many school board members think that compulsory sex education
is a good idea. After hearing, however, that the district might force
their children to attend sex education classes, some religious parents
threaten to challenge the constitutionality of any compulsory sex
education program.
To avoid this litigation, some board members propose allowing
all students who can show that sex education violates their religious
beliefs to opt out of sex education class. This exemption clause, how-
ever, worries many board members and parents. The district has not
previously taught sex education precisely because so many public
school students have parents who vigorously oppose sex education.
Given their opposition, these parents will probably invoke the ex-
emption clause, and, given their strongly held religious beliefs, they
will do so successfully. A large percentage of the students thus could
be exempt from sex education class while the other students are
compelled to attend the class. Some board members worry that by
giving students different schedules on the basis of their religious
backgrounds, the exemptions could highlight the differences among
different religious groups, thereby increasing the likelihood of school
violence. In addition, many conservative parents have expressed
concern that their opted-out children will feel alienated from their
classmates,14 and many liberal parents question the efficacy of a sex
education program that exempts those students who need the edu-
cation most.15
14. This concern is common among sex education opponents. For example, Professor
Luker explains how, in response to one mother's opposition to sex education, other fami-
lies wonder why she does not simply have her child opt out and go to the library while
the other children attend sex education class. LUKER, supra note 1, at 27. Professor
Luker writes that this opt-out suggestion angers the mother just as much as her refusal
to opt out angers others. Id. One reason why it angers the mother so much is that "she
thinks her son will feel weird and different going to the library when everyone else
stays behind." Id.
15. Proponents of sex education may worry that parents who opt their children out
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Weighing the costs of the disorder and tension that exemptions
might create against the limited benefits of a sex education program
in which a large percentage of the most information-starved students
are exempt from class, the majority of the board believes that com-
pulsory sex education with exemptions is a bad idea. For these board
members, the solution is either to institute compulsory sex education
without an exemption or to do nothing at all. In response to the board's
failure to institute compulsory sex education, some students and par-
ents who support sex education have threatened to file lawsuits, claim-
ing that all public high schools are compelled by the United States
Constitution to teach sex education.
16
Confused by the fact that both the supporters and the opponents
of sex education seem to think that the Constitution is on their side,
the school board has come to you, its attorney, with two questions
that are critical to how it will respond to the litigation threatened by
these groups. The questions are: (1) whether the Constitution re-
quires public high schools to teach sex education, and (2) whether the
Constitution requires public high schools to exempt from class those
students who claim that sex education burdens their or their parents'
religious beliefs.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE SEX EDUCATION PROBLEM UNDER THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
A. Does the Constitution Require Public High Schools to Teach
Sex Education?
At least one commentator has noted the absence of a single "case
upholding the child's affirmative right to access to sex education and
holding that the school has a duty to make sex education or condoms
of sex education will not teach sex education adequately at home, and that as a result
the community will have some sexually uneducated children, who in turn will spread
the risks of uninformed sex to others. Id. at 29-30. According to Melanie Stevens, a sex
education supporter in Professor Luker's field study, opt-outs are dangerous because
one ignorant child in the community puts "all of our precious, beautiful children.., at
risk of death." Id. at 30.
16. Note that the claim here is not that all public schools must teach sex education
but that all public high schools must teach sex education. The claim is limited to high
schools because the strongest argument for a right to sex education would come from
mature minors and their parents. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640-43 (1979) (ex-
plaining how mature minors might have constitutional rights that less mature minors
do not possess); Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging Right for Mature Minors to Receive
Information, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 223, 244 (1999) ("There is of course a [constitutional]
distinction between limiting the ideas to which a preschooler is exposed and limiting
those that reach an adolescent.").
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accessible to all students."1 Accordingly, this section extrapolates
from the case law the strongest arguments for such a right. The three
constitutional provisions that most strongly support the claim that
the Constitution requires public high schools to teach sex education
are: (1) the Free Speech Clause, 8 (2) the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,"9 and (3) the Establishment Clause.20
1. The Free Speech Clause
The Free Speech Clause expressly guarantees a right to speak.21
Intrinsically tied to the right to speak is the right to know;22 the
Supreme Court has recognized this link when ruling that the Free
Speech Clause guarantees citizens a right to acquire information.23
Based on the Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence, the right
to acquire sex information may be applicable to public schools in two
ways. The stronger free speech right to acquire sex information in
public school means that when public schools make curricular deci-
sions, they must consider the interests that students have in acquir-
ing sex information. This right translates into a public high school
student's constitutional right to take sex education classes. A weaker
free speech right limits the power that public schools may exercise
when they deprive students of access to sex information. This right
does not require public high schools to teach sex education but in-
stead prohibits public high schools from withdrawing sex information
that they already have in their possession. Although the focus of this
article is the state's obligation to educate young people about sex, not
its weaker obligation to provide access to sex information, the scope
of each right is important to the solutions proposed in Part III, and
the following section discusses each accordingly.
17. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Speaking Truth to Power: Challenging "The Power
of Parents to Control the Education of Their Own" 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 481,
491 (2002).
18. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
19. "No State shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
20. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
21. See supra note 15.
22. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 44 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that
"the right to know is the corollary of the right to speak").
23. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301,305 (1965) (holding unconsti-
tutional, on the basis of limiting free speech, a statute requiring the post office to destroy
unsealed communist mailings from foreign countries if the addressee did not return a
reply card).
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a. The Right to Acquire Sex Information in the
Classroom
The strongest free speech right to acquire sex information would
empower public high school students with the right to take sex edu-
cation classes. Supporters of this right can draw inspiration from
Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26
v. Pico.24 The dispute in Pico arose after the local school board de-
cided to remove controversial fiction books from the public junior
high school and high school libraries.25 Some students and parents
challenged this decision, arguing that because the Free Speech
Clause guarantees a right to acquire information,26 the school board
violated the students' free speech rights.27
Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Brennan found that
the school board may have violated the Free Speech Clause, depending
on the school board's reasoning for removing the books.28 Although
public schools may remove books from their libraries for many rea-
sons, public schools may not remove a book on the basis that it is con-
troversial.29 Although Justice Brennan addressed only the removal
of books from libraries, a court could extend Justice Brennan's reason-
ing to other media besides books and to locations outside of the library.
To persuade a court to extend this reasoning, sex education sup-
porters could argue that the right to acquire information in public
schools should be based on the recipient's interest in the information.3"
By connecting one's interest in information with how much one
values the information, sex education supporters can argue that the
strength of a student's right to acquire certain information should
be based on how much the student values it. With informational
value as the primary criterion, sex education supporters can argue
that the right should not be limited to a particular location or to a
particular medium.
24. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
25. Id. at 857-58.
26. Id. at 867.
27. Id. at 859.
28. Id. at 872. This proposition, however, is dictum because the actual holding in the
case was to remand for development of the facts, that is, to determine why the library
removed the books. Id. at 875.
29. Id. at 874-75. Additionally, lower courts have interpreted Pico to mean that
public schools may not deprive students of information on the basis of the information's
controversial content. See, e.g., Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022,
1027 (9th Cir. 1998) (interpreting Pico to mean that "students' First Amendment right
of access to information is violated when schools remove books from [the] library in [a]
content-based manner").
30. See, e.g., Monteiro, 158 F.3d at 1027 n.5.
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Moreover, if the strength of this right is based on the informa-
tional value, then sex information should receive more constitutional
protection than the literary works at issue in Pico. Unlike the literary
works in Pico,31 sex education is not only important to the intellectual
development of students, but it is also crucial to the health of stu-
dents. Under this analysis, a public school should have less discretion
in depriving students of access to sex information than it had under
Pico in removing controversial works of fiction.32 The supporters of
sex education thus could argue that not only are public schools pro-
hibited from depriving students of sex information in the library, but
public schools are also required to provide sex information in the class-
room, and accordingly, public high schools must teach sex education.
This argument, however, would prevail only if a court were to
interpret Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Pico broadly, apply-
ing it to information transmitted to students outside of the library.3"
If, as is more likely, a court were to read Justice Brennan's opinion
narrowly, applying it only to the removal of library books,34 a court
could easily find that the Free Speech Clause does not guarantee a
right to sex education classes. Under a narrow reading of Pico, the
Court's other cases considering the question of how much discretion
public schools may exercise in regulating the curriculum are more rel-
evant than Pico. Two important decisions in this respect are Hazel-
wood School District v. Kuhlmeier35 and Epperson v. Arkansas.36
31. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
856-58 (1982).
32. Id. at 870-71, noting that the school board has
significant discretion to determine the content of school libraries. But that
discretion may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or political
manner .... Our constitution does not permit the official suppression of
ideas. Thus whether petitioners' removal of books from their school librar-
ies denied respondents their First Amendment rights depends upon the
motivation behind petitioners' actions.
33. Although no court has held that Pico requires public schools to teach sex education,
some courts have held that Pico provides a right to information that extends outside the
library. Brown v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Nebraska, 640 F. Supp. 674, 678 (D. Neb.
1986) ('Therefore, [Pico means that] the Constitution is violated where the 'decisive factor'
in a school board's decision is the intent to deny the students access to the ideas with
which the board disagrees."). Some academic commentators have interpreted Pico in this
manner also. See, e.g., Tyll van Geer, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Govern-
mental Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEX. L. REV. 197, 231 (1983) ('Thus, Justice
Brennan moved toward the view that the first amendment imposes an affirmative duty
on schools to assure that students are exposed to a variety of viewpoints .... ").
34. The holding in Pico was narrow in scope. Id. at 871 (noting that the Supreme Court
was only concerned with the suppression of ideas and thus the "holding... affects only
the discretion to remove books").
35. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
36. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court held that a public school's
regulation of curriculum-related speech does not raise free speech
concerns if the regulation is "reasonably related to legitimate peda-
gogical concerns."37 The Hazelwood decision establishes that students
do not have an unlimited right to expression in the classroom. As a
result the decision strongly suggests that students do not have a free
speech right to take sex education classes. Indeed, if public schools
have the power to regulate what kind of information is expressed in
the classroom, as the Court held in Hazelwood,38 then it follows that
public schools have the power to regulate what type of information
students acquire in the classroom.
Furthermore, Justice Black's concurrence in Epperson provides
ample support for the proposition that students have no free speech
right to sex education. 9 In Epperson, the Court held that Arkansas
violated the Establishment Clause by endorsing a creationist inter-
pretation of human development.4 ° In his concurrence, Justice Black
argued that Arkansas did not violate the Constitution simply by con-
demning natural science.4 He reasoned that because students do
not have a constitutional right to learn a certain subject in public
school, a public school therefore may decide not to teach a subject
either because the subject is not a priority for the school or because
the school considers the subject too controversial for public con-
sumption.4" Thus, even if a state wanted to remove biology from the
curriculum because it found the subject too controversial, it could
do so without violating the Constitution.43
Notably, considerable tension exists between Justice Brennan's
plurality opinion in Pico and Justice Black's concurring opinion in
Epperson. Whereas Justice Brennan's analysis in Pico focused on
the school's motive for depriving students of access to information,44
Justice Black's opinion in Epperson disregarded the school's motive
for withdrawing information from the curriculum so long as that
motive is not clearly religious.45 The tension between these opinions
is noteworthy because a court might look to both Justice Brennan's
plurality opinion and Justice Black's concurrence for guidance when
37. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 268-69.
38. Id.
39. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 113-14.
40. Id. at 109.
41. Id. at 113.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
870-71 (1982).
45. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 113 (1968).
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dealing with the question of whether the Free Speech Clause requires
public schools to teach sex education.
Although the Supreme Court decided Pico after Epperson,
Epperson is likely more relevant because, unlike Pico, it dealt with
a curricular decision.46 Given that neither Epperson nor Pico provide
mandatory authority for a lower court,47 and that Epperson probably
has more persuasive authority with regard to curricular questions,
a court would probably look to Epperson when determining whether
students have a free speech right to sex education. Therefore, de-
spite Pico's broad language, a court probably would hold that under
Epperson and Hazelwood students do not have a free speech right to
acquire sex information in the classroom, regardless of how impor-
tant that information might be to some students.
b. The Right to Acquire Sex Information in the School
Library
Although one can stretch Pico to apply to curricular decisions,
a more faithful reading would treat Pico as constraining only a
school's decisions regarding library books. If this reading were to
apply to school library books containing sex information ("sex infor-
mation books"), students might have a free speech right to acquire
sex information in the school library. This free speech right to acquire
sex education materials in the school library could have two appli-
cations: one obligating public school libraries to acquire such books
and another obligating them to retain books they have provided in
the past. The latter is more consistent with the facts at issue in Pico.
In determining whether the holding in Pico requires public school
libraries to provide any sex information books, a critical fact in the
case is that the Island Trees School District removed the books from
the school's library.4" Not only did the facts of the case not involve
the acquisition of the books, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion sug-
gested that a constitutional distinction exists between a public school's
decision not to acquire books and a public school's decision to remove
books.49 Accordingly, a court can hold that Pico creates an obligation
46. Compare Epperson, 393 U.S. at 113 ("[T]here is no reason ... why a state is
without power to withdraw from its curriculum any subject deemed too emotional and
controversial for its public schools") with Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 872 ("[L]ocal school boards
may not remove books from [the] school library shelves simply because they dislike the
ideas contained in the book").
47. Of course, a court could simply ignore both opinions, because neither Justice
Black's concurrence nor Justice Brennan's plurality is controlling precedent.
48. Pico, 457 U.S. at 856-58.
49. Id. at 862 (noting that "[r]espondents have not sought to compel their school
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on the part of public schools to provide controversial books to students
only after the school has acquired and shelved such books. This inter-
pretation is indeed how many lower courts have interpreted Pico.50
Under this interpretation, public schools may not remove sex in-
formation books already in the library's possession on the basis of
their controversial content, but public schools may decide that they
will never provide such books to students. Read in this light, Pico is
a powerful case for students in schools with libraries full of sex infor-
mation books. Pico, however, is of little value to students demanding
sex information books from public schools that have never held these
materials in their library collections. To receive sex information, these
students in public schools that have never provided sex information
books need to point to an affirmative state educational obligation.
An important case in this respect is San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez.51 In Rodriguez, parents claimed that un-
equal funding of public education 2 violated the Equal Protection
Clause "because [education] is essential to the effective exercise of
First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the right
to vote."53 To support this claim, the parents noted that if a person
does not receive the training to speak and think intelligently, the
rights to speak and vote are meaningless.54 Without education, the
marketplace of ideas is an empty market, and the ballot is just a
blank piece of paper.
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell began his analysis by
searching the text of the Constitution for a right to public educa-
tion.55 He determined that because no provision in the Constitution
Board to add to the school library shelves any books that students desire to read" but
"[r]ather, the only action challenged in this case is the removal from school libraries of
books originally placed there by the school authorities, or without objection from them").
50. Lower courts have interpreted Pico to mean only that public schools may not
remove certain books from the library. See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School Dist.,
2005 WL 578974, at *3 (M.D.Pa. Mar. 10, 2005) (holding that Pico "would only be rele-
vant if Plaintiffs were seeking to remove books from Dover Area School District's public
school libraries") (emphasis added); PMG Intern. Div., LLC v. Cohen, 57 F. Supp. 2d 916,
919 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ("[E]ven the [Pico] plurality opinion expressly limits its application
to the situation where a school removes certain books from library shelves"), affrd, PMG
Intern. Div. L.L.C. v. Rumsfeld, 303 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2002); Monteiro v. Tempe Union
High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 1998) (interpreting Pico to mean that
"students' First Amendment right of access to information is violated when schools
remove books from library in a content-based manner").
51. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
52. The dispute in Rodriguez arose after Texas's policy of basing local school expen-
ditures on property taxes resulted in schools in wealthy districts having much more money
than schools in poor districts. Id. at 11-16.
53. Id. at 35.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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even suggests such a right,56 the only way the parents could prevail
is if they could show that public education is necessary to fulfill a
textual right.57 Justice Powell rejected that argument as applied to
the plaintiffs because even if public education were a nexus for free
speech, Texas had not destroyed that nexus by providing universal
but unequal education."
At first glance, Rodriguez seems to invalidate the proposition
that the Free Speech Clause requires the government to provide sex
information. Surely if the government does not have the obligation
under the Free Speech Clause to provide education, then it must not
have the greater obligation to provide information about a specific
subject. On further examination, however, the Rodriguez decision
might interpret the Free Speech Clause as imposing subject-specific
educational obligations upon states. Because Rodriguez involved a
dispute over a decision to provide universal but unequal education,59
whether states have an obligation to provide universal education re-
mains an unsettled question.
In Rodriguez Justice Powell indicated that the Constitution
might require the government to teach citizens only "the basic min-
imal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech."6
Thus one could still argue after Rodriguez that the government may
not deny its citizens information fundamental to communication. In
other words, the door remains open for a future court to find a state
obligation to provide information that is necessary to a citizen's abil-
ity to communicate with others.6
Sex education supporters could argue that this door is still open
for a state obligation to provide sex information because sex education
56. Note however that some state constitutions provide an explicit right to edu-
cation. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; N.J. CONST.
art. VIII, § 4; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1 and 2.
57. San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-37 (1972).
58. Id. at 37.
59. Id. at 10-16 (describing Texas's state and local tax system utilized to fund public
education).
60. Id. at 37, declaring that
[w]hatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financing
system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any
of its children, that argument provides no basis for finding an interference
with fundamental rights where.., no charge fairly could be made that the
system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic
minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of ful
participation in the political process.
(emphasis added).
61. Some commentators have described this idea as the "unheld holding" of Rodriguez.
See Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the
U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U.
L. REV. 550, 566 (1992).
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is more fundamental to communication than many general subjects
considered central to the high school curriculum. For example, sex
education is arguably more fundamental to communication than
math. This argument may not be intuitive. After all, a basic under-
standing of math is probably necessary for a person to participate
in the marketplace. Nonetheless, one could argue that sex education
is more fundamental to communication for the majority of American
citizens because sex education teaches a person how to express to
others how she feels about such fundamental matters as her desire
to procreate or her interest in remaining healthy. Moreover, by en-
abling people to become comfortable with their sexual identities, sex
education facilitates a person's ability to communicate with others.62
For this reason, some rank the importance of sex education with the
traditional "three R's," reading, writing, and arithmetic.63 Viewed in
this light, the idea that sex education is more fundamental to commu-
nication than a general subject like math may be quite sensible. For
many individuals, lessons about health and family planning apply
to daily communication, unlike forgotten lectures on sine curves.
This application of Rodriguez to sex education may appear im-
plausible because an understanding of sex is not necessary to com-
munication.64 Admittedly, much can be said for this critique, as people
have communicated for years without an advanced understanding
of sex. Even if one rejects the argument that sex education is neces-
sary to communication, one cannot deny that sex education is of great
importance to a person's physical and psychological health.65 It there-
fore follows that sex education is at least important to communication.
Because sex education is important to, rather than necessary to,
communication, a court could find that although the state has no af-
firmative obligation under Rodriguez to teach sex education,66 the
government may have the lesser obligation to provide access to sex
information. If the state has such an obligation, courts may require
local libraries or public school libraries to provide sex information.
As a consequence, if the local library does not permit young people
to access sex information, these students could argue that the gov-
ernment must provide sex information elsewhere, such as the public
school library.
62. JAMEs HITCHCOCK, WHAT IS SECULAR HUMANISM 107 (1982) (declaring that "[t]he
aim of sex education" is now "to help students 'get over their hangups"').
63. RICHARD GREEN, SEXUAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW 176 (1992) ("Advocates of sex
education rank its importance with the 'three R's'; thus failure to receive education in
this area significantly handicaps a person in later life.").
64. See San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1972).
65. See NAT'L EDUC. Assoc. HEALTH NETWORK, supra note 7 (discussing CDC re-
search synthesis finding that sex education has only positive effects).
66. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-38.
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This shifting obligation from the local library to the public
school library is particularly relevant after United States v. American
Library Association, in which the Supreme Court upheld a congres-
sional act forbidding public libraries receiving federal funding from
granting uninhibited Internet access to minors.67 After this decision,
many minors might not be able to acquire sex information on the
Internet in their local public libraries because such information could
be blocked by a filter.6" If minors cannot acquire sex information from
their local public libraries, Rodriguez might require the government
to provide some sex information in public school libraries. In addition,
under Pico, if this sex information is provided in the form of books,
the state may not remove the books from the public school library on
the basis of their controversial content. 69 Thus, even under the liberal
interpretations provided in this section, the strongest obligation on
public schools is to provide some sex information books in the library.
2. The Due Process Clause
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause to
mean that the government may not unreasonably burden the exer-
cise of certain unenumerated privacy rights.7" Under this reading
of the Due Process Clause, students could assert that they have a
constitutional right to acquire sex information. Furthermore, parents
could argue that they have a constitutional right to have their tax
dollars used to inform their children about sex. This article exam-
ines the students' due process argument in Part II.A.2.a and the
parents' due process argument in Part II.A.2.b.
a. A Student's Constitutional Right to Make Private
Decisions
Students can argue that they have a right to acquire sex informa-
tion because they have a due process right to make private decisions.71
67. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
68. See Children's Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-594, 114 Stat. 2763 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. § 9134 and 47 U.S.C. § 254) (requiring
libraries who receive certain federal funds to put into place a "technology protection
measure" to prevents minors from accessing pornography, obscenity, or other materials
that could be "harmful to minors").
69. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
871-72 (1982).
70. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)
(noting that a state law that creates "a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's
choice [to terminate her pregnancy] cannot be considered a permissible means of serving
its legitimate ends").
71. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973), noting that
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If students have such a right to sex information, a court could find
that public schools must teach sex education or alternatively must
provide access to sex information. Whatever the extent of the right,
however, a due process right to sex information would require public
schools to provide an educational service.
The Supreme Court has not found a positive obligation in the
Due Process Clause. Instead, the Court has found only negative lib-
erties: the right to be free from unreasonable governmental inter-
vention when making decisions that implicate liberty interests. 2
The Court has held that citizens have a right to be free from unreason-
able governmental intervention when they make decisions regarding
contraception, 3 abortion, 74 and their sexuality.7 ' Thus, the strongest
argument for a due process right to acquire sex information connects
the power to make these constitutionally protected decisions with
the acquisition of sex information.
Several commentators have noted the close analytical relation-
ship between these decisions and sex information. For example, in
her groundbreaking article on the constitutional rights of minors to
receive information, Professor Catherine J. Ross notes that, "[t]he
right of minors to information about sexuality and contraception
flows analytically from the privacy right to obtain an abortion with-
out parental consent."76 The freedom to choose is predicated on deci-
sional power, which requires information.
This relationship is significant in terms of a constitutional right
to sex education because strong evidence shows that students do not
have access to accurate sex information outside of school.7 Studies
suggest that for two related reasons many students in the United
States do not have access to accurate sex education outside of school.
One reason is that many parents do not provide sex education at
home. 7' The other reason is that many adolescents learn about sex
[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy [however]
the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy ... does exist
under the Constitution. [Case law makes] it clear that only personal rights
that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in ordered liberty,' are included
in this guarantee of personal privacy [, which] is broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
72. See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. at 863-64.
73. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
74. Roe, 410 U.S. 153-54.
75. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
76. Ross, supra note 16, at 259.
77. See GREEN, supra note 63, at 184 (noting that "only 15 percent of mothers and
less than 8 percent of fathers of children up to eleven years old had talked to their children
about premarital intercourse"). Studies suggest that even fewer parents talk to their
pre-adolescent children about sexually transmitted disease or birth control. Id.
78. See id.
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from other adolescents. 79 According to research, many generations
of American children have learned about sex from other children. 0
A 1926 study found that eighty percent of children received their
sex information from other children."1 Amazingly, almost sixty years
later, researchers found in a similar study that other children are
still the most common source of sex information for children.8 2 As
these studies suggest, the majority of students do not learn about sex
at home or school, but from other students.8 3
The problem with students acquiring sex information from other
students is that the information is often false. For example, a com-
mon myth among teenagers is that a girl cannot become pregnant
the first time she has intercourse.8 4 As some teenagers acquire sex
information only from other students, these teenagers likely will
have difficulty verifying the validity of sex information. Indeed, with-
out a rudimentary understanding of human sexuality, false sex in-
formation is virtually indistinguishable from true sex information.
Clearly the constitutionally protected right to make private decisions
about sex means little if one needs sex information to make these
decisions, but one's only access to sex information is unverifiable
and often false. Unfortunately this predicament is reality for many
American public school students; their constitutional rights to make
private decisions about sex is not very meaningful because they can-
not fully exercise their rights.
Notwithstanding this unfortunate situation, students probably
do not have a constitutional right to acquire sex information under
the Due Process Clause because the Supreme Court has found that
so long as people can exercise the right to make private decisions
free from governmental intervention, the government does not im-
pinge on their rights by refusing to assist citizens in exercising their
right to information. 5 Under the Court's interpretation of the Due
Process Clause, the mere existence of the right to make private deci-
sions free from governmental penalty, even without the necessary
information to make those decisions intelligently, is sufficient.8 6
Maher v. Roe was the first case in which the Court considered
the relationship between government benefits and the due process
79. Id. at 184-85.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 184.
82. Id. at 185.
83. Id.
84. NikkiKatz, Teen Sex Myths Exposed, in ALLINFOABOUTWOMEN'S IsSuES (2005),
http://allinfoaboutwomensissues.com/teen-sex-myths-exposed.html.
85. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1977).
86. Id.
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right to an abortion.87 The dispute in Maher arose after Connecticut
denied its citizens Medicaid benefits for medically unnecessary
abortions.8 The Court found that because the government does not
have an obligation to assist women in exercising their right to have
an abortion, Connecticut did not violate the Due Process Clause by
denying the use of government benefits for the purpose of obtaining
medically unnecessary abortions.8 9
In Harris v. McCrae, the Court followed Maher's reasoning by
holding that the federal government could refuse to fund abortions
altogether.9 ° In McCrae, Justice Stewart explained why the gov-
ernment does not have an obligation to fund abortions even though
citizens have a constitutional right to choose whether to have an
abortion.91 Justice Stewart pointed out that the Due Process Clause
guarantees liberty, and that this guarantee of liberty does not require
any governmental action. 2 instead it protects people from govern-
mental action.93 Thus, even though the Due Process Clause guaran-
tees the right to have an abortion, "it simply does not follow [from
Roe] that a woman's freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional
entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range
of protected choices."'94 Justice Stewart then applied his understand-
ing of the Due Process Clause to other privacy rights:
It cannot be that because government may not prohibit the use
of contraceptives, [Griswold] or prevent parents from sending
their child to a private school, [Pierce] government, therefore, has
an affirmative constitutional obligation to ensure that all persons
have the financial resources to obtain contraceptives or send
their children to private schools.9 5
The Court extended Justice Stewart's reasoning in Rust v.
Sullivan.96 In Rust, a restriction on abortion counseling for people
receiving federal family planning funds was challenged as an un-
constitutional interference with a woman's right to an abortion.97
The Court found that because the Due Process Clause does not
87. 432 U.S. 464, 464 (1977).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 469-70.




94. Id. at 316.
95. Id. at 318 (citations omitted).
96. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
97. Id. at 203.
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require the government to assist citizens in exercising their right to
have an abortion, the government may prohibit its employees from
providing abortion counseling.98
Notably, Justices wrote dissents in these abortion cases claiming
that if the government does not assist women in exercising the right
to have an abortion, this right may become meaningless for many
women. In Rust, for example, Justice Blackmun wrote that "[bly sup-
pressing medically pertinent information and injecting a restrictive
ideological message unrelated to considerations of maternal health,
the Government places formidable obstacles in the path of ... free-
dom of choice."99 Justice Blackmun concluded that by limiting infor-
mation, "the Government will have obliterated the freedom to choose
as surely as if it had banned abortions outright."'00
Justice Blackmun's dissent rested on the proposition that the free-
dom to choose is predicated upon decisional power. 10 ' Because this
decisional power requires information, the mere existence of the free-
dom to choose, without the information necessary to choose, is mean-
ingless in any practical sense. Applying this reasoning to abortion,
Justice Blackmun found that women who are unaware of the benefits
and risks of abortion cannot fully exercise their power to decide
whether to have an abortion.' 2 Because these women may not know
what will happen if they choose to have an abortion, they are unable
to choose in any meaningful way whether to have an abortion.
As the Court has enunciated in various contexts, the language
of the Due Process Clause does not support Justice Blackmun's rea-
soning.'03 Although the text clearly prohibits the government from de-
priving citizens of liberty, it does not require the government in any
way to protect citizens from other private actors seeking to take away
their liberty. 14 In other words, the Due Process Clause does not guar-
antee liberty; rather the Clause guarantees that the government will
not take away liberty.0 5 It follows that the text of the Due Process
Clause does not suggest that the government has an obligation to
inform women of the risks and benefits of obtaining an abortion.
Indeed, just as the government does not have an obligation to protect
98. Id. at 201-202.
99. Id. at 216 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 217.
101. Id.
102. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 215-17 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103. See, e.g., Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980).
104. See, e.g., Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. Soc. Servs. Dept., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96
(1989) (holding that the government does not have the constitutional obligation to protect
a child from his physically abusive father).
105. Id.
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citizens from private actors, the government does not have an obli-
gation to protect uninformed women from their ignorance. Thus,
although Justice Blackmun's dissent in Rust is logically sound in
terms of what it means to exercise true choice, his analysis is not in
tune with the tenor of the Due Process Clause. °6 Consistent with
the text of the Due Process Clause, the Court has held repeatedly
that states do not have an affirmative duty to provide the services
necessary for women to choose whether to have an abortion.' °7
Based on the Court's textual interpretation of the Due Process
Clause, minors do not have a right to acquire sex information under
the Clause. Just as the Constitution does not protect women from
their ignorance, it does not protect children from the misinforma-
tion disseminated on the playground.' 8 Additionally, just as women
are not entitled to cost-free abortions, minors do not have a right to
cost-free sex information.0 9 Thus, even if the government burdens
a minor's private access to sex information, courts will invalidate the
impediment only if it effectively makes the information inaccessible."'
This level of inaccessibility might be limited to situations in which
the government imposes a civil or criminal penalty on the acquisition
of the information. When the government imposes a minimal burden
on the acquisition, however, such as deciding not to facilitate the acqui-
sition of the information, courts will not find a due process violation."'
The government's obligations under the Due Process Clause are
likely satisfied when it refuses to provide sex education, even if this
refusal leaves only private avenues as the means through which teen-
agers can acquire sex information, such as buying books or renting
videos. This refusal satisfies the government's obligations even if the
costs of acquiring the information, whether in the form of paying
money or enduring humiliation, place the information out of reach
for some teenagers. So long as teenagers can obtain sex information
without fear of suffering a civil or criminal penalty, the government
has no due process obligation to inform students about sex so that
they can make constitutionally protected private decisions.
106. Rust, 500 U.S. at 215-17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Harris, 448 U.S. at 326.
107. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201 (1991); Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 509-10 (1989).
108. Rust, 500 U.S. at 201-02 (holding that the government did not have a positive
obligation to provide funds for abortion counseling).
109. See Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (holding that the government
does not have to supply funds for women to have abortions).
110. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (holding that the
government cannot place an undue burden in a woman's path to receiving an abortion,
a fundamental liberty).
111. Id. at 875-77. The Court makes clear that "not all regulations must be deemed
unwarranted" and that "[n]ot all burdens on the right to decide ... will be undue." Id.
at 876.
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b. The Right to Raise One's Own Child How One Sees Fit
Until this point, the discussion of the Due Process Clause has
focused solely on the liberty interests of students in sex education.
A public school may also violate the Due Process Clause if it im-
pinges upon the liberty interests of parents. As parents are rarely in
a position to educate their children by themselves, the government
acts as a surrogate for parents in educational matters."2 In this role,
the government may exercise discretion to give effect to parental in-
terests. The government's interests and a parent's interests some-
times conflict. The Supreme Court ruled in Meyer v. Nebraska"' and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters14 that when such a conflict arises between
the government and the parent, the Due Process Clause limits the
power that the government may exercise over a child.
The Supreme Court's analysis in Meyer and Pierce is relatively
straightforward. Conflicts of educational interests between parents
and the government trigger a balancing test. 15 If the government's
interests are not strong, the balance will swing in favor of the parent,
as indicated in the Court's decisions in Meyer and Pierce."6 As in all
balancing tests, however, the difficult part lies in weighing the inter-
ests. In this respect, the facts of the cases are helpful. In Meyer, for
instance, the Court declared that the government's interest in lin-
guistic uniformity is too weak to trump a parent's interest in having
her child learn a foreign language." 7 Additionally, in Pierce, the Court
noted that the government's interest in patriotism is too weak to
112. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
113. Id. In Meyer, the Court struck down a Nebraska law forbidding instruction in
any modern language other than English. Id. at 403. The purpose of the law was to
create linguistic uniformity in a region with a large foreign population. Id. at 397-98.
The dispute in Meyer arose after Nebraska used this statute to convict a teacher who
was instructing a class in German. Id. at 396-97. The Court found that, although the
government may "improve the quality of its citizens," the government may not unreason-
ably interfere with a parent's duty to educate his children. Id. at 401. The Court invali-
dated the Nebraska law because it ignored the interests that parents had in their children
learning foreign languages and because Nebraska's interest in linguistic uniformity was
not sufficiently weighty to overcome these parental interests. Id. at 403.
114. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In Pierce, the Court invalidated an Oregon statute requiring
parents and legal guardians to send all children between the ages of eight and sixteen
to public schools. Id. at 534-36. Oregon passed this law to prevent Catholic and foreign
parents from sending their children to parochial schools. Id. at 530-31. As it had in
Meyer, the Pierce Court struck down the statute because it "unreasonably interferes
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control." Id. at 534-35.
115. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-36.
116. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-36.
117. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
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trump a parent's interest in obtaining private education for his or
her child."'
By comparing parents' interests in having their children learn
about sex to parents' interests in having their children learn foreign
languages and attend private schools, parents can argue that the
Due Process Clause requires public schools to teach sex education to
their children. In making this argument, parents can emphasize how
the government's refusal to teach sex education interferes with the
private relationship between parents and their children: the govern-
ment's refusal to teach sex education places the educational respon-
sibility on parents. This responsibility is especially burdensome in
American culture, where open sexual dialogue between parents and
children is rare and even taboo." 9 Moreover, this burden is enhanced
by the fact that many parents may feel that if public schools do not
teach sex education, then they must instruct their children about
sex in order to protect their children from STDs and pregnancy. 120
Accordingly, a school's failure to teach sex education may make some
parents feel compelled to initiate uncomfortable conversations with
their young children, a situation that could be avoided if public schools
educated students about sexual matters. 12' Accordingly, under Meyer
and Pierce, because the government's interest in not teaching sex
education is not very strong, the parental interests in having the
government teach sex education should prevail. 122
The problem with this argument is that it ignores the fact that
some parents strongly believe that public schools should not provide
sex education. Because Meyer and Pierce protect the interests that
all parents have in their children's education, the two decisions are
limited to situations in which the government can accommodate one
group of parental interests without impinging on another group of
parental interests. A brief examination of what would happen if con-
flicting parental interests did not limit Meyer and Pierce demon-
strates that the holdings in both cases must be limited in this way.
Assume that one group of parents wants the government to do
x, a second group of parents wants the government to do y, and the
goals achieved in doing x and y are contradictory. Furthermore, the
government decides to do x, even though doing x conflicts with the
118. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-36.
119. RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 270 n.10 (1992).
120. See Cynthia Dailard, Sex Education: Politics, Parents, Teachers and Teens, THE
GUTrTMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POUCY (Feb. 2001), available at http://www.guttmacher
.org/pubs/tgr/04/1/gr040109.html.
121. See id.
122. See supra notes 113 and 114 and accompanying text for a discussion of the hold-
ings in Meyer and Pierce.
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interests of the second group of parents. If conflicting parental inter-
ests did not limit Meyer and Pierce, the second group of parents could
argue that the Due Process Clause requires the government to do y.
If, however, the Clause required the government to satisfy the inter-
ests of the second group of parents, and if in doing so the government
ignored the conflicting interests of the first group of parents, the
Clause would require the government to ignore the interests of the
first group of parents in their children being educated a certain way.
If the Due Process Clause required satisfying all interests, it
would require the government to do precisely what the Constitution
forbade. Unless one subscribes to a Godelian view of constitutional
interpretation, 113 one must read the Constitution so that it does not
compel contradictory actions. Accordingly, Meyer and Pierce must be
limited when the government makes a decision regarding matters
in which parental interests conflict. In such situations, the govern-
ment must be free to make reasonable decisions, even if in making
those decisions the government must side with one group of parents
over another.
In light of the competing parental interests in the sex education
debate, the government's decision to ignore the interests of parents
who want sex education should be permissible under Meyer and
Pierce so long as the decision is either an effort to please parents who
oppose sex education or the reasonable judgment of the local school
board. Indeed, some lower courts have suggested that for this reason
neither parents who support sex education nor parents who oppose
sex education may prevail in their claims to challenge the govern-
ment's decision either to institute or not to institute sex education. 124
123. The phrase Godelian view of constitutional interpretation refers to an approach
to constitutional interpretation that adopts the incompleteness theorem proposed by the
mathematician Kurt Godel in his famous 1931 paper. KURT GODEL, On Formally
Undecidable Propositions in Principia Mathematica and Related Systems 1 (1931), in
GODEL'S THEOREM IN FOCUS (Stuart G. Shanker ed., 1988). For the proof, see id. at 17.
According to this theorem, axioms in a consistent system sufficiently powerful to produce
propositions will always produce propositions that cannot be proven to be consistent by
the system itself. Id. Only under such a system can the Fourteenth Amendment require
the government to accommodate parental child-rearing interests when doing so violates
other parental child-rearing interests. For another example of how G(del's incompleteness
theorem might relate to constitutional interpretation, see Jesse R. Merriam, Finding
a Ceiling in a Circular Room: Locke v. Davey, Religious Neutrality, and Federalism 16
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 103, 130 (2007).
124. Lower courts have found that Meyer and Pierce do not grant parents the
constitutional right to control the public school curriculum. See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy
& Safer Prods, Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that a policy prohibiting
part-time attendance did not violate parents' right to control their children's education);
Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 699 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding
that compulsory AIDS awareness assembly attendance did not violate the rights of
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As a result, the Due Process Clause does not guarantee parents a
right to have their children learn about sex in school.
3. The Establishment Clause
Proponents of sex education may assert another argument for
sex education: that public schools violate the Establishment Clause125
by deciding not to teach sex education. This argument is by good mea-
sure the weakest of the constitutional arguments for sex education.
Even assuming that students or parents could invoke the Establish-
ment Clause to invalidate a decision that the school board did not
make, which is a generous assumption, it is doubtful that under the
Court's existing Establishment Clause doctrine, the Lemon test,
126
a court would find that a public school violates the Establishment
Clause by making the decision not to teach sex education. This likeli-
hood is reduced from improbable to effectively impossible when one
considers how the Court's dissatisfaction with the Lemon test has led
it to apply the test with a strong emphasis on the government's obli-
gation to act neutrally towards religion.127 Despite the unlikelihood
of finding that a public school that does not teach sex education vio-
lates the Establishment Clause, it might nevertheless be helpful
here to describe how one could analyze a public school's decision not
to teach sex education under the Lemon test and to explain how one
could analyze the issue under the Court's recent Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
In 1971, the Court announced an Establishment Clause test in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.12 Under this test, a governmental act violates
the Establishment Clause if: (1) the government's purpose in the act
is religious; or (2) the act's primary effect advances or inhibits reli-
gion; or (3) the act excessively entangles government and religion.129
Twenty-six years later, inAgostini v. Felton, the Court collapsed the
"entanglement" prong of the Lemon test into the "effects" prong by
explaining that the factors used to determine whether a government
program excessively entangles government and religion are the same
parents to control their children's education because that right does not include free
flow of information in public schools).
125. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion....").
126. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
127. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(noting that government actions should neither endorse nor disapprove of religion).
128. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
129. Id.
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as the factors used to examine the religious effects of the program. 130
The extent of that collapse is not important here, as no conceivable
argument suggests that a governmental institution is entangled with
religion by not teaching sex education. Thus, only the first two prongs
merit discussion below.
Under the first prong of the Lemon test, sex education support-
ers could argue that when a public school decides not to teach sex
education, the public school's purpose is to promote religion. 131 In
the unlikely case that a school board revealed its religious motives
for deciding not to provide sex education, this argument would be
easy to make. In such a case, sex education supporters could make a
prima facie Establishment Clause case by simply pointing to these
religious motives.
132
Many state decisionmakers, however, disguise their religious
motives in secular rhetoric when they nevertheless have religious
motives for making decisions with religious overtones. 3 Decoding
the religious nature of the secular rhetoric poses some difficulties.
To accomplish this task, one would have to argue that despite the
government's professed secular reasons for making the decision, re-
ligious motives were at play. A concealed motive, however, is very dif-
ficult to prove, and courts rarely invalidate laws based on the first
prong of the Lemon test.
Showing religious motive is particularly difficult in the sex edu-
cation context because many secular reasons for not teaching sex
education exist. For example, a school board might frame the issue
in terms of health, an interest that the Court has found to be secu-
lar even when the government uses religious organizations as the
primary vehicle for its promotion. '34 This connection between a pub-
lic school's decision not to teach sex education and the school's inter-
est in health is supported by research indicating that many people
believe that sex discussion increases the likelihood of adolescent
130. 521 U.S. 203, 206 (1997).
131. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (describing the first prong of the Lemon test as
prohibiting government acts with religious purposes).
132. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
133. For example, in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) the Court considered
whether the Louisiana legislature's professed secular motive for passing the "Balanced
Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act" immunized the law from in-
validation under the Establishment Clause. Although the legislators tried to disguise
their obviously religious motives by citing an interest in the open pursuit of scientific
truths, the Court struck down the law. Id. at 586, 589.
134. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 623 (1988). (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("Government has a strong and legitimate secular interest in encouraging sexual re-
straint among young people.").
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sex,135 and that adolescent sexual activity is psychologically and
physically dangerous.
136
Therefore, to prove that the government has a religious purpose
for not having public schools teach sex education, sex education sup-
porters would have to argue that these state decisionmakers made
the decision for religious reasons, even though legitimate secular
reasons support adopting this policy. This argument is impossible
to prove without clear evidence of the decisionmakers' religious mo-
tives. Accordingly, sex education supporters can make a strong case
under the first prong of the Lemon test only in the unlikely case that
the school board revealed their religious motives for deciding not to
teach sex education. In the more likely cases in which the school board
did not have any religious motives, did not reveal any motives, or dis-
guised the religious motives, the argument under the first prong of
the Lemon test is very weak.
Under the second prong of the Lemon test, sex education sup-
porters could argue that the promotion of religion is the primary ef-
fect of the government's decision not to teach sex education.137 This
argument connects the values expressed in not teaching sex educa-
tion with religious objectives. This assertion relates to another argu-
ment, that the Establishment Clause prohibits public schools from
teaching abstinence sex education, an argument advanced by Gary
Simson and Erika Sussman. 138 In making this claim, Simson and
Sussman draw on the close relationship between the Christian
Coalition's objectives and the effects that flow from a public school's
decision to teach abstinence sex education.'39
135. A BBC poll of teenagers found that one in ten teenagers believes that sex
education "made them more likely to have sex." BBC News, Young Take Risks with Sex,
(Feb. 13,2000), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/healthI639566.stm. A poll conducted
by National Public Radio, the Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard's Kennedy School
of Government found that fifty-five percent of Americans believe that "giving teens
information about how to obtain and use condoms will not encourage them to have
sexual intercourse earlier than they would have otherwise." NPR, Sex Education in
America: An NPR/Kaiser/Kennedy School Poll (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.npr
.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=1622610. But see NAT'L EDUC. ASSOC. HEALTH
NETWORK, supra note 7 (discussing CDC research synthesis finding that sex education
does not actually increase sexual activity).
136. One study found that sexually active adolescents are less likely to be happy and
more likely to commit suicide than non-sexually active adolescents. See Karen S. Peterson,
Study Links Depression, Suicide Rates to Teen Sex, USA TODAY, June 2003, available
at http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2003-06-03-teen-usatx.htm. In addition, sexual
activity always involves some risk to a person's physical health, even when condoms are
used. See POSNER, supra note 119, at 270.
137. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
138. Gary Simson & Erika Sussman, Keeping the Sex in Sex Education: The First
Amendment's Religion Clauses and the Sex Education Debate, 9S. CAL. REV. L. &WOMEN'S
STUD. 265, 265 (2000).
139. Simson and Sussman point to the fact that "Sex Respect," the most widely used
2007] WHY DON'T MORE PUBLIC SCHOOLS TEACH SEX EDUCATION?
One can make a similar argument when a public school refuses
to teach any form of sex education. This argument would draw on the
fact that many in the religious right reject the discussion of sex in a
public manner, 140 and a rejection of public discussion of sex is pre-
cisely what a public school achieves when it decides not to teach sex
education. This argument, however, would not prevail because the
Lemon test forbids only those religious effects that the court finds to
beprimary, not those that are merely incidental.' Thus, the effects
prong in the Lemon test cannot be applied to find a state act uncon-
stitutional simply because it coincides with a religious objective.142 In-
stead, a government act satisfies the effects prong when its secular
effects clearly outweigh its religious effects. 43 As such a situation
seems to arise when a public school does not teach sex education,
most courts would probably find that public schools have no obli-
gation to teach sex education under the effects prong.
To prevail under the Lemon test, supporters of sex education
would either have to decipher government motives or connect the ab-
sence of a sex education program to primarily religious objectives. 144
Because accomplishing either of these tasks would be difficult, pre-
vailing under the Lemon test would be almost impossible.
Making matters more difficult, the Court has modified the scope
of the Establishment Clause by emphasizing in many cases that the
Establishment Clause does not require complete separation between
religion and government but that the Clause requires the government
to act neutrally towards religion. 14' Applying this neutrality require-
ment to government funding, the Court has found that the govern-
ment may fund religious organizations so long as the government
does not discriminate on the basis of religion and the effect of the act
is not inherently religious.1
46
abstinence-only curriculum in the United States, is modeled after religious manuals,
encourages participation from the religious community, and often incorporates religious
beliefs. Indeed, many of the basic lessons of Sex Respect, for example, the sanctity of
marriage, the immorality of abortion, the abnormality of homosexuality, are based
heavily on literal scriptural interpretation. Id. at 284, 287-88.
140. For example, one religious right organization, Concerned Women for America,
opposes "gay rights, sex education, drug and alcohol education." Concerned Women for
America, Profile (Feb. 17, 2004), http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1459.
141. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
142. Id. at 614.
143. Id. at 615.
144. Id.
145. See Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe,
Mitchell v. Helms, and theArc of the Establishment Clause, 42WM. &MARYL. REV. 771,
816-18 (2001).
146. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (upholding a voucher
program that resulted in the government indirectly aiding sectarian schools because the
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If a court were to apply this neutrality requirement to a school
board's decision not to teach sex education, it would be virtually im-
possible to find an Establishment Clause violation. First, a school
board does not discriminate on the basis of religion when it decides
not to teach sex education. Second, the decision not to teach sex edu-
cation is not an inherently religious decision; indeed, because re-
search connects adolescent sex to real secular harms147 and because
some people believe that sex education increases adolescent sex,148
the basis for making the decision is not inherently religious, even if
we find it misguided as a policy matter. Therefore, under the Court's
recent case law, even in the unlikely case that a plaintiff could prove
either that the government had a religious purpose for not teaching
sex education or that the government achieved religious objectives
by not teaching sex education, it would be very difficult for sex edu-
cation supporters to succeed in using the Establishment Clause to
compel a public school to teach sex education.
B. Are Some Students Constitutionally Entitled to Exemptions
from Sex Education?
Continuing the school district hypothetical, suppose the school
district decides that all public high school students must attend
multiple class periods of sex education as part of a mandatory health
course.149 The question remains whether those students who oppose
program was "neutral with respect to religion"); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810-11
(2000) (plurality opinion) (upholding the government's direct aid of sectarian schools
because the aid program was neutral between sectarian schools and others, and the gov-
ernment did not engage in religious indoctrination by providing the aid); Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 203 (1997) (allowing Title I services in private, religiously-affiliated
schools); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988) (holding a congressional statute
authorizing funding for religious organizations to provide adolescent sexual counseling
facially valid under the Establishment Clause).
147. See, e.g., Robert Rector, Kirk A. Johnson, & Lauren R. Noyes, Sexually Active
Teens Are More Likely to Be Depressed and to Attempt Suicide, in A REPORT OF THE
HERITAGE CENTER FOR DATA ANALYSIS 1, 3 (June 2, 2003) (noting that eight thousand
teens are infected with an STD each day, teenage mothers are very likely to live in
poverty, and sexually active teens are more likely to be depressed and attempt suicide
than non-sexually active teens), available at http://www.heritage.org/Reasearch/Family/
uploadI43062_l.pdf.
148. See, e.g., Simson &Sussman, supra note 139, at 288 (quoting the SEX RESPECT-
TEACHER MANUAL as stating that teens should not be taught about contraception be-
cause 'sex outside of marriage is not healthy for the teens [therefore] why offer them
advice on 'how to do it'?"').
149. As explained supra Part II.A.2.a, although the Constitution certainly does not
require public schools to teach sex education, the Free Speech Clause probably prohibits
public schools from removing sex information from their libraries and might require states
to provide access to sex information. In addition, the Due Process Clause might forbid
states from unreasonably burdening adolescent access to sex information.
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sex education for religious reasons are entitled under the Free
Exercise Clause to exemptions from sex education.5 '
1. The Status of Wisconsin v. Yoder after Employment
Division v. Smith
Before the Supreme Court decided Employment Division v.
Smith,'5' the only means through which a citizen could claim a free
exercise exemption from a law was to demonstrate that the law
substantially burdened the exercise of his or her sincerely held re-
ligious beliefs,'52 unless the government could show that denying an
exemption was necessary to serve a "compelling state interest." '153
Under this pre-Smith standard, the Court held in Wisconsin v. Yoder
that Amish students were entitled to exemptions from a Wisconsin
compulsory school attendance law. 15 Currently Yoder provides the
strongest argument for students and parents seeking exemptions
from compulsory sex education. Smith, however, radically changed
the free exercise doctrine, and determining the status of Yoder after
Smith is critical to an analysis of the strength of a citizen's argument
for exemptions.
150. Some lower courts have found that students are not entitled to all-out ex-
emptions from sex education under the Free Exercise Clause. Most notably, the Second
Circuit upheld a Catholic student's compulsory attendance in health class when he could
opt out of family-life instruction and AIDS education classes, Leebaert v. Harrington,
332 F.3d 134, 141-43 (2d Cir. 2003), and the First Circuit upheld the one-time compulsory
attendance of a ninety minute AIDs awareness program, Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer
Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525,539 (1st Cir. 1995). Neither of these cases, however, addressed
what is at issue here: whether religious students are entitled to exemptions from multiple
class periods of sex education. Note also that courts have enjoined entire sex education
programs for directly challenging religious views on sexuality. See, e.g., Citizens For A
Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery County Public Schools, 2005 WL 1075634, at
* 13 (D. Md. May 5, 2005) (granting a temporary restraining order from teaching sexual
education curriculum that depicted homosexuality as a valid lifestyle choice because the
teachings violated the First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs). Such a religion-hostile
program presents relatively easy questions under the Establishment and Free Speech
Clauses. See, e.g., Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/
(May 6, 2005, 13:44 EST) ("The curriculum involves the public school unconstitutionally
taking a stand on theological questions."). Such a program is not, however, the focus of
Part II.B. As the goal of this article is to determine whether the Constitution discourages
schools from teaching even the most basic and seemingly benign forms of sex education,
Part II.B will deal with the more difficult case of whether students are entitled to exemp-
tions from a sex education program that, while seeking to teach children about sex without
addressing religious matters, nonetheless offends some religious beliefs.
151. Employment Div., Dept. Of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
152. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 420 (1963).
153. Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
154. 406 U.S. 205, 235-36 (1972).
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In Smith, the Court upheld an Oregon law that prohibited the
use of peyote. 15 5 Although the law substantially burdened the exer-
cise of a Native American religious ritual, the Court held that the law
did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the law applied to
the general population and the government did not target a religious
practice or religious group in passing the law.1"6 The Court has ap-
plied Smith to mean that laws that incidentally burden religious ex-
ercise, no matter how much, are presumptively valid and therefore
do not need to satisfy strict scrutiny.157
Under the post-Smith standard, compulsory sex education does
not violate the Free Exercise Clause. If the program applies to all
schoolchildren and does not target any religious group or practice,
it is religion-neutral and generally applicable, and, as such, the pro-
gram is presumptively valid under Smith."' Accordingly, students
and parents do not appear to have a constitutional right under the
post-Smith Free Exercise Clause to an exemption from compulsory
sex education. Indeed, some lower courts have held just that. 59
Students and parents seeking exemptions from compulsory sex
education might prevail under the stricter standard established in
Yoder.16 ° For the Yoder standard to apply to their claim, however,
students and parents seeking exemptions must first demonstrate
that Yoder survives Smith. In this respect, an important part of the
Smith opinion is the section dealing with "hybrid situation[s]." 1"
Writing for the majority in Smith, Justice Scalia tried to explain
why the court in Smith applied a lower standard than the Court had
applied in previous free exercise cases.162 In explaining one category
155. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
156. Id. at 879-80.
157. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32
(1993) (invalidating a Hialeah ordinance that targeted a religious group's practice of
animal sacrifice). Note that pre-Smith strict scrutiny still applies under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") when federal laws substantially burden religious
exercise. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(1)-(4) (1993).
In addition, laws passed in states with their own RFRAs are subject to strict scrutiny
when they substantially burden religious exercise. See, e.g., People v. DeJonge, 442 Mich.
266 (1993).
158. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
159. See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 538-39 (1st Cir.
1995) (rejecting a Free Exercise Clause challenge to sexually explicit public school assem-
bly because the school's decision to have the assembly was neutral and generally
applicable).
160. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). For a subsequent application of
Yoder, see, e.g., Ware v. Valley Stream H.S., 550 N.Y.S.2d 167, 177-78 (1989) (suggesting
that a New York State Department of Education's regulation requiring students to attend
classes on AIDS might be invalid as applied to some religious believers).
161. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
162. Id. at 881.
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of the Court's previous free exercise cases, Justice Scalia claimed that
a higher free exercise standard applied to cases that presented hybrid
situations.163 According to Justice Scalia, a hybrid situation arises
when a law substantially burdens both a person's religious exercise
and another constitutional interest.164 With respect to a hybrid situ-
ation, a higher standard than the Smith standard applies even when
the law is religion-neutral and generally applicable.165
Justice Scalia claimed in Smith that this hybrid exception ex-
plains why the Court applied a higher standard to the religion-
neutral and generally applicable law at issue in Yoder. 166 The Yoder
case was a hybrid situation because the compulsory school atten-
dance law at issue both substantially burdened the Amish parents'
sincerely held religious beliefs and impinged upon their constitu-
tional interest in rearing their children how they saw fit.167 Thus,
even though the compulsory school attendance law was religion-
neutral and generally applicable, the Amish parents were entitled
to exemptions for their children.168
Applying this hybrid situation language to compulsory sex edu-
cation, religious students and parents can make a strong argument
for exemptions. Indeed, if the government cannot demonstrate that
denying exemptions from sex education is necessary to achieve a com-
pelling governmental interest, public schools must provide exemptions
to those students who can show that sex education both substantially
burdens their or their parents' religious exercise and impinges on
another constitutional interest of theirs or their parents. One prob-
lem with this argument is that because the Supreme Court has not
clarified which claims fall under this hybrid exception, the Circuit
Courts follow three different approaches to the hybrid exception,
each approach pointing the claimant in a different direction.
One approach, which the First Circuit supports, applies the hy-
brid exception when a plaintiff articulates a free exercise claim and
an independent constitutional interest upon which he or she could
prevail.169 Justice Souter has sharply criticized this approach on the
basis that it does not change the substantive or procedural rights
of claimants. 171
163. Id. at 881-82.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 881.
167. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 n.1 (1990).
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995).
170. This approach does not seem to change the substantive rights of plaintiffs because
under this approach a plaintiff who can win on another constitutional claim does not
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A second approach to the hybrid exception applies the exception
when a plaintiff brings a colorable claim in addition to the free exer-
cise claim. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have applied this approach
to mean that the non-free exercise claim must be serious, even though
it need not be sufficiently strong to win the case.171 The problem with
this approach is that many plaintiffs could color their free exercise
claims to meet this requirement. 172 Thus, litigants in courts following
this approach could use the hybrid exception that Smith created to
swallow the Smith rule.
A third approach to the hybrid exception does not treat the ex-
ception as an exception at all. The Second and Sixth Circuits ignore
Smith's hybrid situations language under the premise that it does
not make sense for free exercise standards to change because of the
existence of another constitutional interest.'73 Some Justices and
commentators have made this point, suggesting that Justice Scalia
need to make the free exercise claim at all; she can prevail with or without the free exer-
cise claim. As Justice Souter declared in Lukumi,
if a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an exemption
from a formally neutral, generally applicable law under another constitu-
tional provision, then there would have been no reason for the Court in what
Smith calls the hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause
at all.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring). This approach does not seem to change the procedural rights
of plaintiffs either; before Smith, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already allowed
plaintiffs to join federal constitutional claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a) ("A party asserting
a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may
join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or
maritime, as the party has against an opposing party.").
171. See, e.g., Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 165 F.3d 692, 703 (9th
Cir. 1999) rehearing granted, opinion withdrawn by, 192 F.3d 1208, 1999 WL 965613
(Oct. 19, 1999); Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 1999) (relying on Thomas);
Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding
that claiming a hybrid exception "at least requires a colorable showing of infringement
of recognized and specific constitutional rights, rather than the mere invocation of a
general right such as the right to control the education of one's child").
172. For instance, any burden on a child's religious exercise could be articulated under
case law as a violation of the parents' constitutionally protected child-rearing interests.
Surely, if sex education substantially burdens a child's religious exercise, the parents of
the child could make a persuasive argument under Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder that sex
education impermissibly interferes with their right to rear their children how they see fit.
173. See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that
a father's right to direct the education of his child does not require his son's school to
exempt him from a compulsory health class because the court could see "no good reason
for the standard of review [in free exercise cases] to vary simply with the number of con-
stitutional rights that the plaintiff asserts have been violated"); Knight v. Conn. Dep't
of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that Smith's "language relating
to hybrid claims is dicta and not binding on this court"); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trustees, 5
F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that the proposition that the legal standard of the
Free Exercise Clause changes when a Free Exercise claim is brought with another con-
stitutional interest is "completely illogical").
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discussed hybrid situations in the Smith opinion not to create a new
doctrine but for the sole purpose of reconciling the discrepant out-
comes in Yoder and Smith.'74
The sharp split among the circuits in applying the hybrid ex-
ception renders the status of Yoder unclear. If a plaintiff raises a
claim in a Circuit that applies either the first or the second approach,
the hybrid exception exists, but depending on the Circuit, the ex-
ception might mean that the parents in Yoder prevailed on the basis
of either: (a) their child-rearing interest alone; (b) their free exercise
claim alone; or (c) the special relationship between the two claims.'75
Thus, whether the Circuit follows the first or second approach might
be quite significant to a parent seeking an exemption from sex edu-
cation for her child. Depending on the approach, the parent might
frame her argument differently, claiming that sex education impinges
upon her child-rearing interests or that sex education violates his or
his child's religious beliefs, or perhaps even that some type of synergy
of both claims exists.
Alternatively, a plaintiff brings a claim in a Circuit that does not
recognize the hybrid exception, then the question remains of whether
Yoder survived Smith. In Yoder, the Supreme Court analyzed the
Amish parents' claim exclusively in terms of the Free Exercise
Clause,176 and thus the case is probably best understood as a free
exercise case, as Justice O'Connor contended in Smith.'77 Under the
Smith free exercise standard, the law at issue in Yoder is valid.'
Therefore, if the hybrid exception does not exist, as the third ap-
proach opines, then Yoder is no longer good law.
174. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision,
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1121 (1990) ("One suspects that the notion of 'hybrid' claims
was created for the sole purpose of distinguishing Yoder in this case."). Justice O'Connor
raised this point in her dissenting opinion in Smith:
The Court endeavors to escape from [these] decisions in Cantwell and
Yoder by labeling them 'hybrid' decisions, but there is no denying that both
cases expressly relied on the Free Exercise Clause, and that we have con-
sistently regarded those cases as part of the mainstream of our free exercise
jurisprudence.
Employment Div. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 896 (1990).
175. Compare Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995)
(utilizing the first approach in which a hybrid exception is only available when the plaintiff
claims an independent constitutional interest) with Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998) (utilizing the second approach in which the
plaintiff need only bring a colorable claim in addition to the free exercise claim).
176. The Yoder Court explicitly stated that it struck down the law because it violated
"the basic religious tenets of the Amish faith." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218
(1972).
177. Justice O'Connor claimed that "there is no denying that [Yoder] expressly relied
on the Free Exercise Clause." Smith, 494 U.S. at 896.
178. Yoder involved a Wisconsin compulsory school-attendance law that applied to
the general population. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207.
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Where does that leave an analysis of a claim for an exemption
from compulsory sex education? If the hybrid exception exists, the
analysis varies depending on the Circuit. If, however, the hybrid ex-
ception does not exist, then compulsory sex education must be ana-
lyzed under Smith, which would not give students a constitutional
entitlement to exemptions from compulsory sex education. 179 Clearly,
with so much doctrinal uncertainty in this area of constitutional law,
it is nearly impossible to analyze a student's constitutional claim for
an exemption with any certainty.
Despite this uncertainty, it must be emphasized that the Court
has never overruled Yoder. To the contrary, the Smith Court con-
firmed that Yoder was decided correctly.8 0 Indeed, although the court
in Smith might have reconfigured Yoder by explaining Yoder as a hy-
brid situation, the Smith Court never suggested that it would have
decided Yoder differently. 11 As one district court stated:
Whatever the hybrid-rights exception may mean in other contexts,
the Smith Court's decision to distinguish, rather than overrule,
Yoder suggests its belief that a statute or policy that implicates
the particular combination of rights at issue in that case, free exer-
cise and the parental right to direct the religious upbringing of
her children, necessitates the application of heightened scrutiny. 182
Thus the narrow holding of Yoder, that no state may compel
children to participate in an activity that threatens the existence of
their parents' religious community, survived Smith.183 Accordingly,
regardless of whether a hybrid exception exists, the best argument
for those seeking religious exemptions from sex education is to show
how similar their situation is to that of the Amish children and par-
ents in Yoder.
2. Applying Yoder to Compulsory Sex Education
A closer examination of the facts in Yoder reveals the parallel be-
tween compulsory sex education for some religious groups and com-
pulsory school attendance for the Amish. In Yoder, Amish parents
claimed that Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law threat-
ened the harmony of the Amish community.8 4 The Amish parents
179. Under Smith a school's decision to provide compulsory sex education is probably
valid. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
180. Employment Div. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
181. See id.
182. Hicks v. Halifax County Bd. of Educ., 93 F.Supp.2d 649, 661 (E.D. N.C. 1999).
183. Id.
184. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
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explained how, because the Amish loathe pride and value humil-
ity,185 Amish children must avoid the competition and materialism
that pervade high school life. 8' For this reason, Wisconsin substan-
tially burdened the Amish tradition by requiring Amish children to
attend high school. 18 7 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger
agreed with the Amish parents that the Wisconsin law violated the
Free Exercise Clause,88 basing his opinion on the premise that high
school "places Amish children in an environment hostile to Amish
beliefs with increasing emphasis on competition in class work and
sports and with pressure to conform to the styles, manners, and ways
of the peer group."18 9
Different religious groups could pose strong arguments under
Yoder for exemptions from compulsory sex education because compul-
sory sex education could burden some religious beliefs similarly to
how high school burdens Amish religious beliefs. Although a discus-
sion of all the possible ways that sex education could offend every re-
ligious belief is beyond the pale of this article, it might be helpful to
examine some religious objections to common themes in sex education.
A central aim of sex education is to make young people feel com-
fortable with their sexual desires. 90 With this aim in mind, many sex
educators teach students that homosexuality is natural and morally
acceptable.' 9 ' Many religions, however, teach that homosexuality is
unnatural and therefore sinful. The Vatican, for example, teaches
that homosexuality is sinful because it violates God's design.'92
185. Id. at 210-11.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 211-12.
188. Id. at 234.
189. Id. at 211. Many commentators have criticized the Court's opinion for roman-
ticizing the Amish way. See, e.g., MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION
AND THE RULE OF LAw 131 (2005) (explaining that the Yoder decision is her "Vote for the
worst Religion Clause case in the United States" and that she would "deep-six it for its
romantic, rose-colored depiction of Amish life").
190. A good illustration of this aim is found in the University of Michigan Health
System's suggested sex education books. Most of the titles refer to the body and its re-
sponses to sexual stimuli. University of Michigan Health System, Sex Education: Resource
List (2006), http://www.med.umich.edu/llibr/pa/pa-blsexedupep.htm. An example of
such a title is KAREN GRAVELLE, WHAT'S GOING ON DOWN THERE?: ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
BOYS FIND HARD TO ASK (1998).
191. See, e.g., NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, When Kids Don't Have a Straight
Answer, http://www.nea.org/neatoday/0103/health.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2007) (dis-
cussing methods schools can use to create a supportive environment for homosexual
teens).
192. CATECHISMUS ECCLESIAE CATHOLICAE [CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH],
You Shall Love Your Neighbor As Yourself- Chastity and Homosexuality pt. II, § 2, ch.
2, art. VI.ii, para. 2357 (1992), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/
_P85.HTM. This section of the Catechism states:
Basing itself on Sacred Scripture, which presents homosexual acts as acts
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Following the Vatican, many Roman Catholics condemn homosexual
conduct.'93 When analyzing Yoder's applicability to religious sex edu-
cation exemptions based upon homosexuality, one must differenti-
ate between a person who condemns homosexual conduct because
of the Vatican's teachings (religious reasons) and a person who con-
demns homosexual conduct because of social norms or individual
fears (secular reasons). A Roman Catholic can argue that any sug-
gestion that homosexuality is moral contradicts her sincerely held
religious beliefs, and as a result a Roman Catholic student can pose
a strong argument that a school's decision to discuss homosexuality
in amoral terms substantially burdens her religious beliefs.'94 Fur-
thermore, because a Roman Catholic parent almost certainly has a
more difficult time inculcating her child with Roman Catholic beliefs
when her child's school expressly contradicts Roman Catholic teach-
ing, in many situations compulsory sex education will substantially
burden the child-rearing interests of Roman Catholic parents, just
as Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law burdened the child-
rearing interests of Amish parents.'95
Even if a sex education program did not discuss homosexuality
and instead merely taught students how to engage in safe sex, many
religious groups could still make a strong case for exemptions from
compulsory sex education. Again, the strongest reaction might come
from Roman Catholic students because a central tenet of Roman
Catholicism is that any intentional interruption of the natural repro-
ductive process is an unjustifiable violation of God's plan.'96 A public
of grave depravity (citation omitted) tradition has always declared that
'homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered' (citation omitted). They are
contrary to the natural law. They close the sexual act to the gift of life.
They do not proceed from a genuine affective and sexual complementarity.
Under no circumstances can they be approved.
Id.
193. See, e.g., LeMonyne College/Zogby International, Contemporary Catholic Trends,
Nov. 16, 2001, http://www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.dbm?ID=506 (noting that a survey
of 1,508 American Catholics found that sixty-one percent believe that homosexuality
violates "natural law").
194. See supra note 192.
195. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 (1972).
196. Professor Christine Gudorf writes:
The basis of this conclusion [that contraception is immoral] is an under-
standing that God's intention in sex is procreation. For some decades now
the hierarchical church has recognized other divine purposes in sexual inter-
course as well, but procreation has been understood as a permanent, central
divine purpose. Papal arguments insist that while humans can make use
of the natural infertile time to engage in sexual intercourse for unitive pur-
poses, it is wrong to use God's gift of sexuality while thwarting the divine
intentions for the act.
Christine Gudorf, Contraceptives and Abortion in Roman Catholicism, in SACRED RIGHTS:
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school therefore violates a Roman Catholic student's religious beliefs
by forcing her to attend instruction on contraception or abortion.
Jewish students and parents also can argue that a compulsory
sex education program that teaches family planning violates their
religious beliefs.197 The Jewish argument against family planning
is based on the premise that some Jewish people are taught that it
is their duty, as members of the sacred covenant between God and
Israel, to produce Jewish progeny. 9 ' Jewish parents might have a
legitimate concern that by teaching students how to have sex with
minimal procreative risk, public schools effectively encourage Jewish
students to have sexual relationships with non-Jewish students, and,
consequently, this increased sexual activity with non-Jewish students
will reduce the number of Jewish offspring.'99 Jewish parents thus
can argue that the government's religion-neutral instruction on fam-
ily planning works against the efforts of Jewish people to follow a
Jewish imperative. Because public schools do not encourage Jewish
students to procreate with Jewish people only (indeed, they may
not lawfully encourage this practice because of the Establishment
Clause), a Jewish parent could claim that her child must be exempt
from any discussion of family planning.
THE CASE FOR CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN WORLD RELIGIONS 55, 67 (Daniel C.
Maguire ed., 2003).
197. Laurie Zolith, Each One an Entire World, in SACRED RIGHTS: THE CASE FOR
CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTIONIN WORLD RELIGIONS 21,23 (Daniel C. Maguire ed., 2003).
198. Rabbi Elliott Dorff, a leading commentator on Judaism, frames in both historical
and metaphysical contexts the Jewish duty to procreate with other Jewish people. He
explains the duty historically, writing that because of the enormous loss of Jewish life
in the Holocaust, Jewish reproduction is "the most important mitzvah of our time." Id.
at 26. He also explains its metaphysical significance, citing Maimonides's claim that
"whoever adds even one Jewish soul is considered as having created an entire world."
Id. Professor Laurie Zolith discusses this duty in terms of the future of Judaism. She
writes that "the Jewish tradition ... is suggestive of a principle for Jewish views on the
ethical problem of population and family planning" and that "[s]uch a view forms the
duty toward a specific future." Id. at 23.
Notice how the Jewish argument against family planning instruction is much broader
than the Roman Catholic argument against safe-sex instruction. The Jewish argument
calls for an exemption from all discussion of family planning that does not encourage
intra-faith procreation, whereas the Roman Catholic argument applies only to safe-sex
instruction that contravenes the Roman Catholic Church's teaching that contraception
and abortion are immoral. One could argue, however, that the Jewish argument is much
weaker than the Roman Catholic argument because the immorality of contraception is
central to Roman Catholic belief, whereas the concept of procreation in Judaism is merely
a religious value or principle, not a religious command. Although this argument might
be true, Jewish parents can bolster their argument against family planning with strong
religious commands, such as that found in the Mishnah in tractate Yevamot, which some
commentators have interpreted to stand for the proposition that abortion violates Jewish
law. Id. at 33-34.
199. See id. at 23.
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Even a sex education class limited to a textbook description of
human sexual anatomy, reproduction, and intercourse still might
burden religious beliefs because some religious believers interpret
their religions to mean that they must avoid sex discussion with non-
believers altogether. Some Muslims, for example, strictly follow the
Shari'ah, the code of Islamic law based on clerical interpretation of
the Koran. °° The Shari'ah has specific rules that apply to sexual con-
duct, and some Islamic authorities have interpreted these rules to
prohibit premarital sex, homosexual acts, and adultery.20 In a school
where Muslims are not the majority, sex educators, of course, do not
incorporate these rules into the classroom discussion. Thus, even
when a public school limits sex education to a description of human
sexuality, it might highlight for Muslim children that other people ig-
nore their religious laws, which they believe emanate from Allah. By
instituting even a biologically-based sex education course, the gov-
ernment might suggest to Muslim students that the state believes
that Islamic law is wrong and hence that the Islamic God is wrong.
Muslim parents, therefore, could claim that the government threat-
ens Islamic beliefs by teaching sex education.
These examples of how sex education might burden the religious
beliefs of different faiths illustrate how difficult it is for schools to
establish a compulsory sex education program that does not offend
anyone's religious beliefs. When a public school teaches sex edu-
cation, religious beliefs and state action invariably intersect. As a
result, many religious beliefs and values are drawn into question.
This questioning can be burdensome for many groups. Indeed, it is
burdensome for a Roman Catholic student to question the Pope, or
for a Jewish student to question what her Rabbi calls a Jewish im-
perative, or for a Muslim student to question the righteousness of
the law emanating from Allah.
To be sure, sex education does not prohibit these students from
following their religious beliefs. Nothing about sex education would
prevent a Roman Catholic student from believing that homosexual-
ity and contraception are wrong, a Jewish student from procreating
with other Jewish people, or a Muslim student from following the
Shari'ah. Nonetheless, the metaphysical questioning raised by sex
education can be quite burdensome for a believer, especially for a
200. See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islam, in OURRELIGIONS 426, 464-66 (Arvind Sharma
ed., 1993).
201. For example, Iran, which follows the Shari'ah as its ultimate legal authority,
executes women convicted of adultery. For an account of an execution of a sixteen-year-
old girl under this authority, see BBC News, Execution of a Teenage Girl (July 27, 2006),
available at http://news.bbc.co.ukl/hi/programmes/5217424.stm.
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young believer who has not yet developed the analytical skills to
ascertain how and why her family's beliefs differ from those of her
classmates. Moreover, sex education can lead to questioning that
might go well beyond the recesses of a student's mind. The ques-
tioning could lead to challenging confrontations at home and per-
haps to dramatic changes in the religious community.
Significantly, these changes to a religious community are pre-
cisely what concerned the Yoder Court.2 °2 The Court was not con-
cerned about what would happen to a few Amish children if they
fraternized with other high school students or learned about popular
culture, but about what would happen to the Amish community if all
the Amish children in Wisconsin were exposed to non-Amish prac-
tices.2 °3 That the Court was concerned about the Amish community
and not the individual is evident from its extensive discussion of the
importance of the Amish religion to the American experience, 20 4 the
historical significance of the Amish religion,20 5 the danger that com-
pulsory education posed to the community,2 6 and the consistency
of Amish practices.20 1
Many other religious groups are similar to the Amish in these
ways. Undoubtedly, many students who strongly believe in Roman
Catholicism, Judaism, or Islam are members of traditional religious
communities that have played a significant role in American soci-
ety.20 ' Furthermore, as demonstrated above, sex education may
threaten the consistently held beliefs practiced by these communi-
ties.209 Therefore, if Yoder is still good law, these groups, and probably
202. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
203. Id.
204. The Court characterized Amish practice as part of a tradition "that continued
in America during much of our early national life." Id. at 210.
205. The Court traced Amish beliefs to the "beginning with the Swiss Anabaptists of
the 16th century." Id.
206. The Court found that "compulsory high school attendance could... ultimately
result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish church community." Id. at 212.
207. The Court found that the Amish consistently practiced their ways for "almost
300 years." Id. at 219.
208. Note however that some commentators have suggested that Christian groups
have the best chance of prevailing under Yoder. See Stephen M. Feldman, A Christian
America and the Separation of Church and State, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL
ANTHOLOGY 261, 262-63 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000).
209. Note however that the Second Circuit ruled that a Catholic man, Mr. Leebaert,
could not exempt his son from health class because his "belief that 'drugs and tobacco
are [not] proper subjects"' did not prove an "irreconcilable Yoder-like clash between the
essence of [his] religious culture and the compulsory health curriculum." Leebaert v.
Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144-45 (2d Cir. 2003). The Leebaert case demonstrates how
claimants, like Mr. Leebaert, who do not assert a strong connection between the chal-
lenged subject matter and the religious community's beliefs and practices are not entitled
to exemptions. Nevertheless, many claimants can make very strong arguments that they
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many more, are constitutionally entitled to exemptions from compul-
sory sex education. Indeed, this result seems particularly likely when
compared to some of the cases finding exemptions for such seemingly
harmless restrictions as uniform requirements, necklace prohibitions,
and hair codes.21°
In conclusion, regardless of how courts treat the hybrid ex-
ception, different religious groups can present very strong argu-
ments under Yoder for constitutionally required exemptions from
sex education. If the claim is litigated in a circuit that applies the
hybrid exception, then the religious parents can simply articulate
their child-rearing interests as an interest in raising their children
in their religious background, much the way the Supreme Court in
Smith framed the parental interests at stake in Yoder.21' Even if the
claim is litigated in a circuit that does not apply the hybrid exception,
religious students and parents can point to Yoder as controlling pre-
cedent. So long as Yoder is good law212 and the claimant is a member
of a religious group that resembles the Amish in the ways empha-
sized by the Court Yoder,2" 3 the claimant is constitutionally entitled
to an exemption from compulsory sex education. The government
may, nevertheless, refuse to grant this exemption if the denial is nec-
essary to serve a compelling government interest.21 4
3. The Government's Interest in and Means of Addressing the
Problems Resulting from Uninformed Teenage Sex
If the government can show that compulsory sex education is nar-
rowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest, then it can
refuse to allow religious exemptions."' The government's strongest
interest in compulsory sex education is almost certainly protecting
students from STDs, 216 which is probably a compelling interest. The
government probably cannot show, however, that compelling students
are entitled to exemptions from compulsory sex education because sex education, as
opposed to health education, creates a Yoder-like clash with many religious values.
210. See, e.g., Hicks v. Halifax County Bd. Of Educ., 93 F.Supp.2d 649,669 (E.D. N.C.
1999); Chalifoux v. New Caney Independent School Dist., 976 F.Supp. 659, 671 (S.D.
Tex. 1997); Alabama & Coushatta Tribes of Texas v. Trustees of the Big Sandy
Independent School Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319, 1335-36 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
211. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
212. As argued above, despite the tension between Smith and Yoder, Yoder likely re-
mains good law because the Court has not overruled its primary holding.
213. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972).
214. Id. at 221.
215. Id.
216. See, e.g., Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550, 571 (N.D.
Tex. 2004) (stating that both the state and the school have a compelling interest in pro-
tecting students from sexually transmitted diseases).
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to attend several class periods of sex education is narrowly tailored
to achieve the government's compelling interest in protecting stu-
dents from STDs.
a. The Government's Compelling Interest in Protecting
Students from STDs
The Supreme Court has established that the health of American
citizens ranks as one of the government's strongest interests. In
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, for instance, the Supreme Court held
that Massachusetts's interest in protecting the general public from
smallpox was sufficiently strong to overcome a citizen's liberty in-
terest in not being vaccinated.217 The Court based its ruling on the
"fundamental principle that 'persons and property are subjected to
all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the State."'218
The Supreme Court also has established that the govern-
ment's interest in protecting the health of all its citizens can trump
one citizen's interest in exercising her religious beliefs. In Prince
v. Massachusetts, for instance, a minor's legal custodian challenged
a Massachusetts child labor law prohibiting minors from selling
newspapers."' The legal custodian and minor were both Jehovah's
Witnesses, 220 and as such they believed their religious duty was to
spread religious material.221 In fulfilling this duty, the legal custodian
and the child distributed religious newspapers.222 After being charged
under the child labor law, the legal custodian claimed that the law vio-
lated both her freedom to exercise her religious beliefs and her right
to rear her child.223 In defense of the law, Massachusetts claimed that
it was necessary to protect the health and welfare of children. 224
Balancing each party's interests, the legal custodian's religious and
child-rearing rights and the state's interest in protecting children
from labor exploitation,225 the Court ruled that the state's interest
outweighed the legal custodian's interest in fulfilling a religious duty
through a child.226
217. 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905). In Jacobson, Mr. Jacobson refused to be vaccinated because
he thought the vaccination would make him ill. Id.
218. Id. at 26 (quoting Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1877)).
219. 321 U.S. 158, 160-61 (1944).
220. Id. at 161.
221. Id. at 163.
222. Id. at 161-62.
223. Id. at 164.
224. Id. at 165.
225. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-66 (1944).
226. Id. ("The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the
community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.").
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Based on Jacobson and Prince, the government's interest in pro-
tecting young people from STDs is clearly compelling.227 Some STDs
are certainly as dangerous to young people as smallpox,22 and many
STDs could potentially be significantly more dangerous to young
people than labor. Thus the government's interest in protecting citi-
zens from STDs is probably as strong as the government's interest
in protecting citizens from smallpox and significantly stronger than
its interest in protecting young people from labor exploitation. Accord-
ingly, it follows that the government's interest in preventing ado-
lescents from acquiring STDs229 outweighs the interest that some
religious groups have in being exempt from sex education classes.
b. Compulsory Sex Education as a Means of Protecting
Children from STDs
The constitutional problem with compulsory sex education, how-
ever, is that compulsory sex education is not as narrowly tailored in
protecting children from STDs as either smallpox vaccinations are
in controlling smallpox or as child labor laws are in protecting chil-
dren from labor exploitation. At least three arguments show why sex
education laws have a broader scope than mandatory vaccinations.23 °
First, compulsory sex education is less effective than vaccina-
tions. Because sex education works only if a person makes sexual
decisions consistent with her education, a person with sex education
who ignores her education by practicing unsafe sex is not any safer
from STDs than is a person who has not had sex education. As it
seems that people who oppose sex education on religious grounds will
be less likely to follow sex education lessons, sex education taught to
students who oppose sex education is probably less effective than sex
education taught to students who favor sex education.231 For example,
227. Note that some religious groups, like the Amish, do not need a high school edu-
cation in order to be productive and self-sufficient. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
228-29 (1972). No religious group, however, has developed a way of life that has im-
munized its believers from the risks of uninformed sex. Accordingly, the government's
interest in providing sex education to all children is certainly stronger than its interest
in providing a high school education to all children.
228. HIV, like smallpox, is highly contagious and often fatal. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROLAND PREVENTION, HIV/AIDS AMONG YOUTH 2 (2006), available at http://www
.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/factsheets/PDF/youth.pdf ("Since the beginning of the epidemic,
an estimated 40,059 young people in the United States had received a diagnosis of AIDS,
and an estimated 10,129 young people with AIDS had died.").
229. Id. At least the state's interest in preventing people from acquiring HIV is
arguably as strong as the state's interest in preventing people from acquiring smallpox.
230. Because sex education is more like a vaccination than a labor law, this section
will focus only on the relationship between sex education and vaccinations.
231. Additionally, many people still question the efficacy of sex education for those
students who do not oppose it on religious grounds. See LUKER, supra note 1, at 248.
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a Roman Catholic student who opposes sex education because she
rejects the use of contraception will probably not use contraception
simply because the government forced her to attend sex education
classes. 23 2 Thus the marginal benefits of teaching sex education to all
students over teaching only those students who want to learn sex
education are slight. A vaccination, by contrast, is effective even if
a person who receives the vaccination opposes it or is unaware of
having received it. Moreover, if the government inoculates a person
who opposes the vaccination on religious grounds, that person cannot
then dispel the vaccination. Thus, unlike sex education, the marginal
benefits of inoculating all citizens over inoculating only those who
want vaccinations are great.
Second, many people who do not take sex education classes are
protected from STDs whereas many people who do not receive a
vaccination are not protected from the relevant virus. Although one
could argue that basic sex information is necessary to have safe sex,
this information may be acquired outside of sex education class for
a small fee (by buying books or renting movies) or for no monetary
cost at all (by talking to relatives or reading books at the public li-
brary).233 Given these alternate means of accessing sex information,
the government need not teach sex education in order to protect people
from STDs. By contrast, the government might have to provide vac-
cinations to protect citizens from a virus; some people are not pro-
tected from a virus unless they receive a vaccination, and many
people without access to healthcare cannot obtain vaccinations.
Third, the burdens created by a vaccination and sex education
are dramatically different. Although some might argue that a vac-
cination is more burdensome because it is an actual invasion of the
body, sex education is probably more burdensome because it is an
enduring invasion of the conscience. Sex education's invasion does
not just last the vaccination's few uncomfortable seconds; the effects
of sex education on a religious person or community can be perma-
nent.234 Even though a vaccination might be burdensome to an indi-
vidual who opposes vaccinations on religious grounds, the government
can protect a person from a virus in very few ways without similarly
burdening the individual. The government has many ways, however,
of preventing STD transmission that are less burdensome than com-
pelling students to attend sex education class.23
232. See supra note 196 and accompanying text for a discussion of Roman Catholic
beliefs in regards to contraception.
233. In fact, many opponents to compulsory sex education argue that sex education
is most effective when taught at home, rather than in school. See, e.g., LUKER, supra
note 1, at 134, 175.
234. Id. at 126-27.
235. For example, instead of compelling students to attend sex education class, the
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Compulsory sex education is not narrowly tailored because the
government does not need to teach sex education to protect children
from STDs, and furthermore because it can achieve its interest in
protecting children from STDs through less burdensome means. Thus,
even though the government probably has a compelling interest in
protecting children from STDs, public schools would most likely be
constitutionally required to exempt from compulsory sex education
those students who can show that sex education substantially bur-
dens her or her parent's religious beliefs.236
III. THE DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE SOLUTIONS
As discussed in Part II.A, very little in the United States Con-
stitution suggests that public schools have an obligation to teach sex
education. The Free Speech Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the
Establishment Clause are the only provisions in the Constitution
that arguably guarantee a right to acquire sex information.237 The
strongest constitutional arguments that sex education supporters can
make are that the Free Speech Clause compels the government to
provide access to sex information in either local or public school li-
braries and prohibits the government from removing sex information
books from the public school library,23 and the Due Process Clause
prohibits the government from unreasonably burdening the acqui-
sition of sex information.239 These arguments do not come very close
to creating a state obligation to teach sex education.
As discussed in Part II.B, however, the constitutional arguments
for exemptions from compulsory sex education are much stronger
than sex education supporters' arguments for requiring sex edu-
cation. Sex education touches on areas that religion traditionally has
controlled, and therefore it is virtually impossible for a public school
not to offend some religious belief when it teaches sex education. In-
deed, both comprehensive and abstinence sex education invariably
draws some religious beliefs into question. This questioning can be
burdensome on some religious communities. Under Yoder, the gov-
ernment may create this type of burden on religious communities
only if it can show that the cause of the burden is narrowly tailored
government can simply provide sex information in local or public school libraries. This
alternative is discussed infra p. 590 as a way in which the state can accomplish the im-
portant objective of instructing young people about sex without substantially burdening
the religious beliefs of students and parents.
236. See supra Part II.B.2.
237. See supra notes 15-17 for the specific language of these clauses.
238. See supra Part II.A. 1 and accompanying text.
239. See supra Part II.A.2 and accompanying text.
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to meet a compelling state interest.24 ° Sex education is almost cer-
tainly not sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve the Government's
interest in protecting children from STDs. Therefore, if Yoder is still
good law, sex education opponents can make a very strong case for
exemptions from sex education. Given these two premises, that the
Constitution almost certainly does not require public schools to
teach sex education and that the Constitution probably requires
public schools that teach sex education to exempt certain religious
students from class, a school district pressured to teach sex edu-
cation has three options.
One option is to teach sex education without exemptions for any
students. The problem with this option is the inevitable constitu-
tional litigation. Many school districts have found that when they do
not allow students to opt out of sex education, high-profile and con-
troversial constitutional disputes follow.24' This type of litigation,
won or lost, can be quite costly, both in terms of the legal expenses
and the negative publicity.242 Even in jurisdictions where courts have
already considered related issues, litigation is likely because the con-
stitutionality of compulsory sex education is far from resolved. Not
only will a school district face continuous challenges, but it may en-
counter different results as the doctrines for religious liberty and
child-rearing rights develop. This development could be particularly
great and unpredictable in the area of religious liberty, where state
and federal statutes have joined forces with state constitutions to
240. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
241. The Montgomery County School District recently learned about the costs and
negative media attention arising from such disputes. After the district court enjoined
the sex education program in Citizens For A Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery
County Public Schools, 2005 WL 1075634, at * 12 (D. Md. May 5, 2005), the school district
settled for thirty-six thousand dollars in attorneys' fees. See Nancy Trejos and Fulvio
Cativo, Montgomery Reaches Sex-Ed Agreement, WASH. POST, June 28,2005, at B5, avail-
able at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentarticle/2005/06/27/AR20050627
01635.html. For the settlement agreement, see Montgomery Public Schools, Board Reso-
lution and Settlement, http://www.mcps.kl2.md.us/info/pdf/BoardResolution&Settlement
.pdf. Note that the Montgomery County case presented relatively easy constitutional
questions. Litigating the doctrinally uncertain and normatively controversial issue
analyzed in Part II.B would likely be more expensive and contentious.
242. As evidence of how governments evaluate the costs of constitutional litigation,
consider the Public Expression of Religion Act of 2005, H.R. 2679, 109th Cong. § 2(b)
(2005), which, if passed, would exempt Establishment Clause claims from the attorney's
fee award provision in 42 U.S.C. §1988. Congress's stated reason for proposing this
exemption was to eliminate the chilling effect that constitutional litigation imposes on
state and local officials. For further discussion of the legal and policy costs that consti-
tutional litigation imposes on government defendants, see generally Gregory C. Sisk,
The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney's Fees for
Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part One), 55 LA. L. REV. 217 (1994) and Gregory
C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney's
Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part Two), 56 LA. L. REV 1 (1995).
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wage war against Smith.243 Even though school districts have won
most of the litigation so far, the landscape is evolving, and the polit-
ical and financial costs could add up quickly.
A second option for school districts is to teach sex education but
to make exemptions available for students who satisfy certain con-
ditions. This option also presents problems. One problem is that stu-
dents will receive different information according to their personal
or their parents' religious beliefs. As a result, some religious com-
munities might not acquire potentially life-saving information. Not
only might this lack of information harm particular religious groups,
but it also might spread the harmful results of one group's sexual
ignorance to others. This option also raises the problem of offering
exemptions to students on the basis of religious affiliation. This
religion-specific treatment could increase tension among different
religious and ethnic groups, a tension that already may be alarming
in many communities.244 This increased tension could anger both sex
education supporters and opponents.245
A third option is not to teach sex education at all. This option
means that some public school students will never receive sex
education, either formally or informally, and that, consequently, the
problems resulting from uninformed or misinformed teen sex will con-
tinue. Although troubling, in districts where the benefits of teaching
sex education do not appear sufficiently strong so as to outweigh op-
tion one's costs of political controversy and constitutional litigation
or option two's costs of limited efficacy and likely religious conflict,
option three is the politically rational decision.
Nevertheless, although not teaching sex education might be the
solution to the local problem posed in Part I, it is hardly a solution to
the national problems that arise from uniformed sexual activity; this
"solution" would only ensure that the United States will continue to
243. As explained supra note 157, in response to Smith, Congress passed RFRA, which
restored the strict scrutiny framework. Then, after the Court held in City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 509 (1997) that Congress had overreached in using its Section 5
power to apply RFRA to the states, about twelve states enacted their own RFRAs. See
EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 977 (2001). Also in response to Smith, states
have interpreted their constitutions to require pre-Smith strict scrutiny when the govern-
ment substantially burdens religious exercise. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235,
240-41 (Wis. 1996). For a general discussion of how and why states have rejected Smith,
see Stuart G. Parsell, Note, Revitalization of the Free Exercise of Religion Under State
Constitutions: A Response to Employment Division v. Smith, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
747 (1993).
244. See LUKER, supra note 1, at 214. See generally Richard W. Garnett, Religion,
Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1666 (2006).
245. See supra notes 13-14, explaining why both sex education supporters and oppo-
nents often dislike opt-outs.
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suffer enormous social, 246 health, 247 and economic248 problems. If these
problems were limited to those parents and students seeking consti-
tutional exemptions from sex education, one might find this situation
distressing but nonetheless tolerable. However, when these problems
apply to even those parents and students who favor and seek sex edu-
cation, such as the hypothetical sex education supporters discussed
in Part I, the people must seriously question whether they are willing
to accept the costs of a constitutional system committed to individ-
ual liberty (with a strong emphasis on religious liberty) and circum-
scribed governmental power (with a strong emphasis on negative
rights and a correspondingly limited provision of positive rights).
Accordingly, any analysis of the constitutional problem addressed
in this article must go beyond mere description and probe the prob-
lem normatively.
To determine what changes to American constitutional law
might be desirable, it will be helpful to examine briefly the constitu-
tional limitations in other countries and to question whether those
countries have fared any better in educating their young people about
sex. Whereas the United States Constitution clearly does not require
the government to teach sex education, some have interpreted the
European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") to require member
states to teach sex education.249 Indeed, one commentator argues that
246. Although rates have decreased substantially over the last decade, teen
pregnancy rates are higher in the United States than in any other developed country.
See THE ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, CAN MORE PROGRESS BE MADE?: TEENAGE
SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOR IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 3 (2001), available at
http://www.gnttmacher.org/pubs/summaries/euroteens summ.pdf; see also AM. COLL.
OF OSTEOPATHIC FAM. PHYSICIANS, DEBATE OVER How To REDUCE HIGH RATE OF TEEN
PREGNANCY (2003). Between sixty-six and ninety-five percent of teen pregnancies are
unplanned, and some researchers have explained these high percentages as "both a
symptom and consequence of extreme poverty and social disorganization." AM. COLL.
OF OSTEOPATHIC FAM. PHYSICIANS, DEBATE OVER How To REDUCE HIGH RATE OF TEEN
PREGNANCY (2003). Research suggests that "[a]dolescents are more likely than adults
to suffer negative consequences from their sexual behavior." Elizabeth A. S. Kelts, M.D.,
et al., Where Are We on Teen Sex?: Delivery of Reproductive Health Services to Adolescents
by Family Physicians, 33 FAM. MED. 376, 376 (2001).
247. From 2000-2004, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) found
that more than half of all new HIV infections in the United States occurred among young
people under age twenty-five, and that most of these infections were transmitted sexually.
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 227, at 1. Recent research
suggests that the health problems resulting from uninformed teen sex are getting worse.
According to a 2004 Kaiser report, approximately sixty-five percent of all sexually trans-
mitted infections contracted by Americans occur in people under twenty-four, and twenty-
five percent of new HIV infections occur in people under twenty-two. Molly Masland,
Carnal Knowledge: The Sex Ed Debate (2006), http://msnbc.msn.com/idI3071001/print/
1/displaymode/1098.
248. A study of teenage mothers found that, within five years of pregnancy, most had
dropped out of high school and 60% were on welfare. GREEN, supra note 63, at 184.
249. See Corinne Packer, Sex Education: Child's Right, Parent's Choice or State's
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Article 10.1 of the ECHR, which provides the right "to receive and
impart information and ideas without the interference by public
authority, 25 ° creates a right to sex information that might obligate
member states to teach sex education.25'
Even more strikingly, the Committee on the Rights of the Child
has interpreted the Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC") to
require member states to teach sex education.252 In fact, the Commit-
tee has interpreted three provisions of the CRC to mean that mem-
ber states have a duty to educate adolescents about sex, 253 and the
Committee has applied this interpretation to its recommendations
to member states. For example, in a recommendation to the Govern-
ment of Uganda, the Committee advised Uganda to "pursue and
strengthen its family planning and reproductive health education
programmes, including for adolescents."' Pursuant to its recommen-
dations, the Committee has demanded information from member
states regarding their compliance with CRC's sex education man-
date.255 Indeed, the Committee requested information from Ireland
regarding "what steps the Government had taken with regard to those
school teachers who had refused to teach sex education, whether they
were permitted to keep their posts, and, if so, how the sex- education
curricula was taught. ' 256 The United States is not a party to either
the ECHR or the CRC.257
Obligation, in OF INNOCENCE AND AUTONOMY: CHILDREN, SEX, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 163,
171 (Eric Heinze ed., 2000).
250. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as
Amended by Protocol No. 11 (European Convention on Human Rights) art. 10, 1, Sept.
2003, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NIRrdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-
5C9014916D7A10/EnglishAnglais.pdf.
251. See Packer, supra note 250, at 171.
252. Id. at 168.
253. Id. The three provisions are: (1) Article 13.1, which provides a right "to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds"; (2) Article 24.1, which provides
a right "to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health"; and (3) Article
24.2(f), which requires states to "develop preventive health care, guidance for parents
and family planning education and services."
254. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Comm. On the Rights of the Child,
Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Rights of the Child: Uganda, 32, 16th
Session, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.80 (Oct. 10, 1997).
255. See generally Office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights,
Committee on the Rights of the Child, http://www.ohchr.org/englishbodies/crc/ (last
visited Feb. 21, 2007).
256. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Comm. On the Rights of the
Child, Summary Record of the 438th Meeting: Ireland 20, 17th Session, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/SR.438 (Jan. 13, 1998).
257. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, DATES OF RATIFICATION OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS (2006), http://
ww.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Basic+Texts/Basic+Texts/Dates+of+ratification+
of+the+European+Convention+on+Human+Rights+and+Additional+Protocols/; OFFICE
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Moreover, although the United States Constitution most likely
does not permit either the federal, state, or local governments to com-
pel students to attend sex education class if attendance substan-
tially burdens their or their parents' religious beliefs, the ECHR may
permit member States to compel attendance so long as they have a
rational basis for doing so.2 58 Article 9.2 of the ECHR allows member
states to impinge on religious freedom if doing so is necessary for
the protection of public order or morality.259 The European Court of
Human Rights has interpreted Article 9.2 under the doctrine of "mar-
gin of appreciation.""26 As the late Father Drinan explained in his last
book on religious liberty and international law, the margin of appreci-
ation doctrine "assumes at its discretion that the national lawmaking
groups in Europe got it right when they decided issues of religious
freedom." '261 This doctrine is similar to rational basis review in United
States constitutional law.262 A sex education law that violates a per-
son's religious beliefs is thus presumed valid under the ECHR, where-
as such a law might have to satisfy a higher standard of review, such
as strict scrutiny, under the United States Constitution.
With this flexibility, many European nations require their public
schools to teach sex education, and not coincidentally, these nations
have experienced the greatest success in reducing teen pregnancy
and STD transmission. 263 The experiences of these European nations
highlight the relationship between the United States Constitution
OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF
RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (2004),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
258. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
as Amended by Protocol No. 11 (European Convention on Human Rights) art. 9, 2,
Sept. 2003, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-
B457-5C9014916D7A10/EnglishAnglais.pdf.
259. Id. The text states: "Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief shall be subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf.
260. ROBERT F. DRINAN, CAN GOD AND CAESAR COEXIST? 90 (2004).
261. Id.
262. According to Father Drinan, the margin of appreciation doctrine is "roughly equiva-
lent to the presumption of constitutionality that the courts in the United States employ
when they review laws." Id. In applying this presumption, however, the European Court
of Human Rights is even more deferential than are United States courts. Id. For examples
of cases in which the European Court of Human Rights has applied this deferential stan-
dard to uphold laws burdening religious exercise, see id. at 90-92.
263. For example, Sweden, France, and Great Britain all require their public schools
to teach sex education, usually, but not always, with a greater emphasis on comprehen-
sive sex education. Sweden, the country with the lowest teen birthrate, has required sex
education longer than any other country. See THE ALAN GurrMACHER INSTITUTE, supra
note 246, at 5.
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and teen sex problems and how this relationship will constrain the
United States as it tries to address its sex education dilemma.
Should Americans accept these constraints? This question is too
big to be resolved here, but a few notes should be made about this
issue. One noteworthy point concerns institutional legitimacy and
competency. These constitutional constraints are not the outgrowth
of a single Supreme Court decision. They are a part of a network of
decisions finding in the Constitution a cluster of individual liberties
that cannot be trumped easily by communitarian interests. Because
this commitment to individual liberty provides many social benefits,
many approve of, and some favor strengthening, the doctrines direct-
ing the particular result addressed in this article. Unless Americans
want their courts to reduce constitutional provisions to particular-
ized social utility analyses, they should be careful about urging courts
to approach sex education differently from how they have approached
other religious liberty issues. Put more concretely, if citizens feel that
France has it wrong 64 and that religious liberty means that at all
public schools a Jewish boy has the right to wear a yarmulke and
a Muslim girl has a right to wear religious headdress,26 then perhaps
the United States should also accommodate sex education opponents,
even though doing so has greater and more deleterious social conse-
quences than accommodating religious headgear. As demonstrated
time and time again, courts creating constitutional doctrine accord-
ing to social exigency are doomed to fail as expositors of the law.266
Also notable is that the sex education problem, unlike the con-
stitutional deficiencies addressed in Sandy Levinson's recent book,
results from ambiguity in the relevant constitutional provisions.267
264. French law prohibits students from wearing to public school any clothing, in-
signia, or symbols that "conspicuously manifest a religious affiliation." Law No. 2004-228
of Mar. 15, 2004, Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique Franiaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of
France], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190; JCP G 2004, No. 13, Actu. 168, available at http://www
legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnTexteDeJorf?numjo=MENX0400001L.
265. Most Americans probably think that France has it wrong. See MARCIA. HAMILTON,
GOD VS. THE GAVEL 128 (2005) (describing America's "drive to accommodate religious
conduct"). For the thoughts of a particularly influential citizen on the wisdom of the
French law, see Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 734 (2004) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
266. Some of the Supreme Court's most critiqued decisions ignore broad constitu-
tional rules in the name of public necessity. See, e.g., Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214,
216 (1944) (holding that the Fifth Amendment's equal protection requirement that the
federal government treat all races equally does not prohibit the United States military
from restricting access to areas on the basis of race because "[p]ressing public necessity
may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions"). See generally Frederick Shauer,
Do Cases Make Bad Law?, U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006).
267. Our Undemocratic Constitution focuses on constitutional provisions not subject
to interpretation. See Levinson, supra note 11, at 163. Levinson focuses on such pro-
visions to advance his thesis that radical changes, not just shifts in judicial doctrine, are
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Indeed, part of the problem here is attributable to constitutional un-
certainty. Recall that in Smith the Court relaxed free exercise re-
quirements to stabilize the Court's uneven treatment of free exercise
claims. By affirming Yoder in the process, however, the Court sent
lower courts in a maelstrom of doctrinal confusion, which only made
the prospect of constitutional litigation more ominous for school
districts. If the Court is prepared to deal with less free exercise pro-
tection, the Court should clearly overrule Yoder so that state decision-
makers can be free from this uncertainty. As the Court said in Casey,
"[1liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt." '268
As a final note, it must be emphasized that the Supreme Court's
decisions are not the only forces at issue here. Private citizens, state
court decisions, and legislative enactments (both state and federal)
all come together to discourage public schools from compelling stu-
dents to take sex education classes. These factors form our constitu-
tional culture and cannot be easily defeated by changing one Supreme
Court decision.2
69
Thus as a practical matter, if school districts are to tackle this
problem, they will have to work within these constraints. Taking
the following three actions is a good place to start. First, the school
districts must make sex information available to those young people
who want it. They can accomplish this goal by providing sex informa-
tion in public libraries. As discussed in Part I.A.2, public schools are
probably forbidden from removing sex information that they have in
their libraries on the basis of the information's controversial content.
Sex education opponents will not have any success mounting a free
exercise challenge as the mere availability of sex information in the
library does not substantially burden a person's religious beliefs.
Second, the school districts must make contraception available
to young people. Public schools can do this by providing free con-
traception in health offices, along with information on how to use
necessary to address the constitutional defects identified in his book. For a discussion
of his proposed radical changes, see id. at 167-80.
268. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
269. Some, of course, see a problem in America's devotion to religious liberty. Marci
Hamilton notes that "[tihe problem in the United States is that too often the drive to
accommodate religious conduct takes flight from common sense." HAMILTON, supra note
265, at 128. Hamilton is right that Americans have a strong drive to accommodate re-
ligious conduct. In criticizing this drive, she offers two examples of voluntary accommo-
dationism: a school board in Lafeyette, Louisiana permitting eight Rastafarian children
to wear coverings over their dreadlocks, and a college dean supporting a Muslim student's
right to wear a hijab. Id. at 126. Although Hamilton is surely right in describing the
existence of this drive, she is probably wrong in characterizing it as irrational. A less
tendentious way of characterizing this "problem" is that Americans rationally express
their sincere belief in universal religious liberty by seeking to accommodate even those
religious practices in which the majority does not engage.
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contraception. Because a student's acquisition of contraceptives
would be entirely voluntary, religious students and parents would
almost certainly lose in a claim that the government has violated
their religious beliefs or familial privacy.27 °
Finally, the school districts must promote dialogue about adoles-
cent sex with the aim of forming a workable sex education program
for all students. School districts can initiate this dialogue through
school assemblies and panel discussions in which different student
groups explain their viewpoints on adolescent sex. As a result of this
dialogue, school districts will have a clearer understanding of how
they can teach sex education without excessively burdening or alien-
ating members of their respective religious communities.
CONCLUSION
What makes the Constitution so fascinating is its protean
quality. While announcing broad legal and moral propositions, the
Constitution provides more than a political philosophy. It is not sim-
ply abstract or theoretical, but relentlessly practical. It touches mun-
dane matters that affect all of our lives, even such local decisions as
whether to teach the community's children about sex. Furthermore,
political actors must always consider its weight, as the Constitution
reaches beyond its borders, inserting itself into political decision-
making as a factor to be considered even when its text does not
clearly dictate the conclusion. The area outside its textual circum-
ference can rule our lives just as if it lay within its core.
As some of the Court's conservative members have admonished
their liberal colleagues, the Constitution does not authorize the
federal judiciary to cure all of the nation's problems. Indeed, the
Constitution does not speak to every political problem. As demon-
strated in Parts II and III, not only does the Constitution not solve
every social problem, it also raises new conflicts. For instance, this
article elucidates how, by making the provision of sex education more
difficult for public schools, the Constitution can discourage schools
270. See, e.g., Curtis v. Sch. Comm. of Falmouth, 652 N.E.2d 580, 587 (Mass. 1995)
(holding that "[blecause ... the [condom availability] program lacks any degree of
coercion or compulsion in violation of the plaintiffs' parental liberties, or their familial
privacy, we conclude also that neither an opt-out provision nor parental notification is
required by the Federal Constitution'). Note however that one case, Alfonso v. Fernandez,
606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 1993), has held that the United States Constitution requires
opt-out provisions for contraception availability programs. It is likely that Alfonso was
decided wrongly. The Alfonso dissent argued, "the mere fact that parents are required
to send their children to school does not vest the condom... program with the aura of
'compulsion' necessary to make out a viable claim of deprivation of a fundamental con-
stitutional right." Id. at 272 (Eiber, J., dissenting).
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from selecting what is probably the most effective policy solution to
the problem of STDs and teen pregnancy.
The problem addressed in this article raises fundamental ques-
tions about what citizens want from their Constitution and judi-
ciary. Some might be tempted to say that courts must interpret the
Constitution differently to reach the right conclusion, in this case
to encourage public schools to teach sex education. After all, the
Constitution, as stated above, is not merely an abstract piece of po-
litical philosophy but rather a practical document, and as such we
must be able to shape it to meet our political needs. Others, of course,
inveigh against this idea of politics seducing the judiciary into inter-
preting a living Constitution. Regardless of the merits of these war-
ring interpretive approaches, it is clear that we must develop greater
care in describing, and less deference in criticizing, a document that
can be a source of significant social problems. Only through this crit-
ical dialogue can communities determine their needs and limitations,
and consequently develop the policies that effectively address the
problems posed by this article.
